tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-78704698970785373922024-03-13T10:18:11.111-07:00The AfricanistScholarship, News and Analysis on Uganda and BeyondDr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.comBlogger30125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-66819045006694696102014-02-27T22:33:00.001-08:002014-03-01T17:45:09.448-08:00The Anti-Homosexuality Act, 2014On Monday 24th February, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni signed into law the long-debated Anti-Homosexuality Act. The act introduces new offences and extended sentences for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people (see the All Out poster, below). The passing of the law drew immediate criticism from the international community, with UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHR) Navi Pillay describing it as ‘deeply concerning’, US Secretary of State John Kerry comparing it to anti-Semitic legislation passed by the Nazis in the 1930s, and rights groups such as New York-based Human Rights Watch (HRW) observing that it is a violation of fundamental human rights.<br />
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Following the signing, a number of Uganda’s largest donors placed their aid programmes under immediate review. White House spokesman Jay Carney said that the US – which is one of Uganda’s largest donors, with a programme worth more than US$400 million per year – was reviewing its assistance to the country. Denmark immediately withheld US$9 million from its aid programme, and Norway cancelled US$8 million of its support for Uganda. The World Bank also withheld a US$90 million loan package. The passing of the law also produced other economic effects as well, including a drop in value of the Ugandan Shilling - which fell 2.9% against the US dollar - and a call from some business leaders, led by British entrepreneur Richard Branson, for investors to boycott the country. </div>
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Although in the period following the act’s signing, Museveni has attempted to present the new law as a great show of strength, and as an example of his government's independent-mindedness from ‘western’ influences – for example, during an extended interview that he gave to CNN on 24th itself (available <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/24/world/africa/uganda-homosexuality-interview/" target="_blank">here</a>) – in reality the new bill, and the manner in which it was passed, highlight growing weaknesses within his presidency, as well as the increasing disconnect between his executive and the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM)’s parliamentary caucus. <br />
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These weaknesses have in fact been evident ever since the Anti-Homosexuality Bill was first introduced, in 2009. Although the original draft was tabled as a private members bill – by David Bahati, MP for Ndorwa West – it quickly became a cause celebre of a group of younger NRM MPs who, distrustful both of the president and of his executive, have made it their political project to check Museveni’s powers. From the outset, this group of ‘young turks’ recognized that if this new law could be passed, then it would draw a strong reaction from donors, and lead to significant aid suspensions, and that this would be in turn be a huge blow for Museveni. This is because, despite all of the recent talk of imminent new petrodollars, the president remains largely dependent on foreign aid to fund the enormous networks of political sponsorship that he has used, since seizing power in 1986, to extend his influence throughout the country (especially in the rural areas). As of 2012, foreign aid still accounts for 20% of Uganda's entire budget, with a value of around US$1.6 billion. </div>
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Thus, although Museveni’s personal views are themselves certainly homophobic – a US embassy cable released by Wikileaks in 2009 described his opinions regarding homosexuality as ‘quite intemperate’, and as influenced by those of his wife Janet (who is a born-again Christian), while in the CNN interview referred to above, he called homosexuals ‘disgusting’ – he nevertheless recognized the potential threat that the bill posed to him, and he therefore moved quickly to quash it. In late 2009, the president issued an executive order against the bill, and he set up a special parliamentary committee that found the draft legislation to be legally unsound. When this didn’t work, and the bill was reintroduced again, in February 2012 (albeit with its former provision for the death penalty – for acts of ‘aggravated homosexuality’ – removed), he then directed the executive both to filibuster its passage through parliament, and to publically condemn it as (again) legally 'redundant'. </div>
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However, in the period since early 2012, the group of NRM ‘young turks’ – whose parliamentary numbers significantly increased in the February 2011 general elections – have become greatly emboldened, and have challenged the president on an increasingly wide range of issues and legislation. Ironically, they have received at least some encouragement in these efforts from international rights-based organizations, who have separately come to regard the group as a key constituency for avoiding the emergence of a ‘resource curse’ once Uganda’s new oil comes on-stream in a few years times (in addition to the Anti-Homosexuality Bill, oil has been another of the rebel MPs ‘causes celebres’). In addition, though, the group has also received funding and support from a number of (especially US-based) evangelical Christian networks. Most importantly of all, though, during 2012, the young turks have also found a new, and very powerful, de facto leader in the person of Parliamentary Speaker Rebecca Kadaga. Although still the Vice Chairperson of the NRM, in recent months Kadaga has emerged as Museveni’s most significant political rival, and has challenged him directly on a number of issues (for example, on his ongoing attempts to have four members of rebel MPs group – Theodore Ssekikubo, Wilfred Niwagaba, Mohammed Nsereko, and Barnabas Tinkasimire – thrown out of parliament).<br />
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It was through the direct intervention of Rebecca Kadaga that the Anti-Homosexuality Bill finally got through parliament. On 20th December last year, Kadaga allowed the bill to be tabled for a third time – even though it was not on the order papers for that week – and having packed the house with their supporters, the rebels finally managed to pass the bill. Yet even after that, the executive continued to fight the bill, for example on 28th December when Museveni wrote a 28-page letter to Kadaga, and to all MPs, claiming that the vote was illegal, because the house lacked a quorum when it was taken (by 20th December, most MPs had already left for their Christmas vacations). Later, the president went on to say that he would delay signing the bill into law until he had consulted with the scientific community over whether homosexuality was an outcome of genetic predispositions, or socialization. However, on 24th February, following growing pressure from the popular press – which was also responsible for generating the major 'moral panic' over homosexuality that followed the first tabling of the bill, in 2009 – Museveni finally gave up, and signed the bill into law. <br />
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Looking ahead, the passing of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill will almost certainly have at least three major effects. Firstly, it will result in further significant aid cancellations, of the sort that have already begun. Even though some of these monies will doubtless eventually be restored, following the passing of this new law, all donors will be under huge pressure (from their own domestic constituencies) to follow the UK's lead in shifting their support away from 'direct aid' - i.e. money which is given directly to the state itself - towards more 'indirect' forms of assistance - through which funds are funnelled directly to civil society organisations. The UK have already made this shift following a corruption scandal in November 2012. Such a shift would revert back to 1990s-era approaches, which were later rejected for undermining state legitimacy and capacity.<br />
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Any major move towards indirect aid would have huge repercussions for Museveni himself, who is heavily dependent on direct foreign aid to fund his networks of political sponsorship. Ever since he came to power, Museveni has used decentralisation - and the proliferation of local administrative structures that this has generated - to deepen his influence throughout the country, especially in the rural areas. Without direct aid, the president will instead become more reliant on the military to extend his power. These current developments are unlikely to have any effect at all on Uganda's receipt of large levels of 'strategic aid' (i.e. military aid), especially from the US - given what America perceives to be its key regional strategic importance, and the fact that it still provides the majority of the troops for the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) - and Uganda is also now playing a peacekeeping role in South Sudan. In other words, the reaction to this law will likely accelerate current politic trends, which have already seen Museveni making moves to extend the army's role in domestic affairs. For example, during his recent 'anti-poverty campaign' - which unofficially inaugurated his reelection campaign - the president announced plans to set up a military barracks in ever county throughout the country, to oversee 'new initiatives'. The commander of each of these barracks will allegedly report directly to Museveni's brother, Gen. Salim Saleh.<br />
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Secondly, the passing of this new law will greatly embolden the group of rebel NRM MPs, and especially their leader, Mary Kadaga. Indeed, although Museveni will continue to try to check her powers over the coming period, it is now almost inconceivable to think that she will not end up running against him – in some capacity – in the next presidential election (in 2016). Thirdly, and perhaps ironically, the passing of this law may in fact increase Museveni’s general standing within the wider pan-African community. In recent years, homophobic sentiment has been harnessed, and encouraged, by an increasing number of African governments, who have used it as a vehicle for promoting African ‘sovereignty’ in the face of (what is perceived to be) increasing outside influence on the continent. In a context in which Museveni has already indicated his plans to run for a senior regional role if and when he does step down as Uganda’s president, his signing this bill into law may therefore improve his chances. </div>
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However, what remains unclear at this stage is what effect the next law will have on the people it most effects: i.e. Uganda’s Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) community? In the days since the law has been passed, the community has come in for greatly increased vitriol in the press, with the tabloid Red Pepper, for example, publishing the names of Uganda’s ‘Top 200 Gays’ - in a move which has frightening echoes of Rolling Stone’s 2010 publication of the photographs of 100 gay people, alongside a banner headline reading ‘Hang Them!’ That publication was shortly followed by the brutal murder of gay-rights activist David Kato. </div>
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However, whether this current wave of homophobia is sustained into the longer term will depend very much on how the new law is implemented. Although the death penalty has been removed, the new law amongst other things still increases penalties for some forms of same-sex conduct between adults; outlaws lesbianism for the first time, and; introduces new offenses of ‘promoting homosexuality’ (which could include offering legal advice to gay people, and/or offering health services). Yet how many of these new and increased offenses will be actually enforced by the courts remains to be seen. In the only positive development this week, the Minister of Health, Ruhakana Rugunda, has already said that all health services will continue to be provided in an equitable manner, regardless of patients’ sexual orientation.<br />
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There is a proverb in Runyankore/Rukiga, '<i>enjoojo kwirwana obunyansi nubwo bubonabona</i>' - 'when elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers'. As Museveni and Kadaga lock horns ahead of 2016, Uganda's LGBT community bears the brunt.<br />
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Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-5068581128634839142013-04-25T18:06:00.000-07:002013-04-26T20:20:09.772-07:00Oil and AidRecent weeks have seen a number of significant developments in Uganda’s nascent oil sector, which in combination, may speed up the start of production. The first occurred on 21st March, when President Museveni finally signed into law the Petroleum (Exploration, Development, Production and Value Addition) Bill. The bill – which is designed to be the first of three new pieces of legislation relating to country’s recent oil finds in the Lake Albertine Graeburn – had taken more than two and a half years to get through parliament, following a sustained challenge led by a group of rebel MPs within the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM). Then, on 3rd April, a three-member arbitration panel in London found in favour of the Ugandan government in its long-running legal dispute with Canada’s Heritage Oil (over US$434 million which Kampala claims it is owed in capital gains tax on Heritage’s 2009 sale of its oil rights in Uganda to Ireland’s Tullow Oil). Although the decision does not end the dispute – despite the Ugandan government’s claim to the contrary – it nevertheless significantly strengthens the legal basis for Kampala’s future dealings with international mining companies operating in the country. Finally, on 15th April, the government announced that it had finally reached a decision on the building of a new oil refinery at Kabaale-Biseruka (which is close to the newly discovered fields) – in which the government hopes to retain a 40% stake. On the one hand, the planned refinery is much smaller than the one the government had hoped for: the new plant will have an initial capacity of only 30,000 barrels per day (b/d), which is significantly lower than the 200,000 b/d originally envisaged. Yet on the other, this means that the refinery will be much cheaper to build, and will therefore come on-stream much more quickly. <br />
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<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-N2J_WgaOd_M/UXtC6ElIWkI/AAAAAAAAAF8/TZP052uhLgM/s1600/uganda-oil-001.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-N2J_WgaOd_M/UXtC6ElIWkI/AAAAAAAAAF8/TZP052uhLgM/s400/uganda-oil-001.jpg" width="400" /></a>These potential breakthroughs with the oil sector come at an important time for the Ugandan government, which is still struggling with the fall-out from November’s aid suspensions by many of the country’s main donors. The donors’ coordinated action – which followed allegations that the Office of Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi had embezzled US$13 million of aid meant for the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) – involved the freezing of the entire Joint Budget Support Framework (JBSF) for 2013, and has left the government with a shortfall of US$300 million (7.1%) in its annual budget. In response, in early March the Finance Ministry was forced to publish a revised budget which envisaged deep cuts to ministries’ spending, and to social service provision, as well as a reduction in infrastructural investment. Anecdotal evidence suggests that large numbers of civil servants have already gone several months without pay. In addition, the government have also now revised downwards their growth forecasts for 2013, from 5%, to 4.2%. All of this, then, combined with country’s still very high inflation rate, has left the government facing a severe economic crisis.<br />
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On the one hand, the donors’ recent actions have once again highlighted the ineffectiveness of aid suspensions as a policy device. As with the similar suspensions that were recently imposed on Rwanda, the donors – even as they were coordinating their actions – don’t seem to have given much thought as to what they were trying to achieve in the process. Certainly, no explicit demands appear to have been made of the Ugandan government, other than by Sweden (which in late November, demanded that Kampala repay in full the US$6.7 million that Stockholm had contributed to the PRDP). As a result, other than impacting the rank and file of civil servants (who have not been paid in 2013) and presumably also those members of the Ugandan public who rely on social services, it is not clear what effects the aid suspensions are likely to achieve. In an attempt to assuage the donors – and to overturn the suspensions – in November, the Ugandan government ordered the office of the Audit-General to begin a ‘forensic audit’ exercise on the accounts of all government departments, to try to identify fraudulent activity. The following month, they also introduced a ‘High Level Government Finance Reform Action Matrix’, as a general measure aimed at improving economic governance in the country. In addition, the Bank of Uganda (BOU) has also now pledged to reform the system through which bank accounts are set up in the country (in an attempt to reduce the number of ‘ghosts accounts’ through which embezzled funds are frequently channelled.<br />
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However, none of this is likely to have much impact on the activities of the upper-echelons of the NRM - or those with connections to senior figures. Moreover, pressure on the president to target senior colleagues such as Mbabazi has been further weakened, over the past month or so, by growing divisions within the donor community over when the suspensions should end. Following an early-March meeting of all members of the JBSF in Kampala, it emerged that only Britain (which appears to have been the driving force behind the frieze in the first place), as well as Sweden and Denmark, remain committed to the ongoing aid suspensions. Meanwhile, Germany, Ireland, the EU and others have all now indicated that they favour a resumption of aid to Kampala, probably by the year’s end. Yet unless the donors can present a ‘united front’ to Uganda over the action, it is doubtful that the suspensions – however long they are in effect for – will exert any real political pressure in the country. <br />
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On the other hand, though, the recent aid suspensions have had a marked effect in accelerating the government’s current drift towards ‘economic nationalism’. Museveni’s desire to move in this direction has been evident at least since the publication of the recent National Development Plan (NDP), in April 2010. Whilst not advocating full-blown protectionism, the NDP certainly envisages the government exerting much greater control over its own economy. The current aid suspensions have then further accelerated the government’s moves down this line, as evidenced both by their recent moves aimed at getting oil production on-stream as quickly as possible, and by their related shift towards China as a source for development finance. In addition to being heavily involved in Uganda’s oil plans – through the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) – in mid-April Beijing agreed a new US$9.8 million loan to Kampala. Crucially, the new loan, which is part of the US$20 billion that China pledged to Africa in July, appears to have no conditionalities whatsoever attached to it, and the money can therefore be spent entirely at the Ugandan government’s discretion. It also follows another loan, of US$350 million, that China Exim Bank gave to Uganda last year, which the government is planning to spend on a new Entebbe-Kampala road. In these ways, then, Kampala appears to have much greater control over the new Chinese aid than it ever has with monies provided by the ‘traditional donors’. <br />
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However, despite the recent progress that has been made with oil, President Museveni now faces a number of serious obstacle in his plans to further develop the nascent sector, and to use this to further his grip on the domestic economy. In particular, a group of young rebel MPs within the ruling party have vowed to block the presidents moves at every turn. The group has become particularly emboldened since the election of the current (ninth) parliament, in February 2011, during which they have also made oil issues their particular cause celebre. It is this group that was primarily responsible for delaying the first Petroleum bill for so long, and they are now gearing up for a serious fight over thelast piece of planned oil-related legislation: the Public Finance Bill 2012 (which includes an extended section on ‘Petroleum Revenue Management’). Although Museveni has expressed a desire to have this new law passed within the next few months, the ‘young turks’ – supported by the large sections of the media – have vowed to side with the parliamentary opposition in order to defeat it. <br />
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In response to the growing threat posed by these rebel MPs, in January, Museveni briefly vowed to suspend parliament, and to impose martial law on the county – a threat that was later repeated by the head of the army, General Aronda Nyakairima. However, if the aim of the threat was to silence the young turks, then it backfired spectacularly, because it galvanized support for the group not only in parliament, but among the wider population as well. In addition, Museveni’s threat of a ‘palace coup’ also drew a strong reaction from the international community. Nevertheless, over recent months the executive has continuously targeted individual rebels. In December, one of the group’s most outspoken members, Cerinah Nebanda (former MP for Butaleja District), was found dead at a clinic in Kampala, in apparently mysterious circumstances. The government initially claimed that she had been the victim of a drug overdose. However, following apparent discrepancies with the autopsy results, Museveni himself was forced to give two press conferences denying official involvement. </div>
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Then, in January, another leading rebel figure, Theodore Ssekikubo (MP for Lwemiyaga) was arrested on charges of ‘inciting violence’, for a speech he made at Nebanda’s funeral. Although he was later released without charge, in early April, Ssekikubo, along with three other members sitting MPs (Wilfred Niwagaba, Muhammed Nsereko and Barnabas Tinkasiimire), were officially expelled from the NRM. The expulsions have set up a potential constitutional crisis, in that being expelled from the party does not necessarily require the four MPs to stand down from parliament – even though this is the president’s obvious wish. Interestingly, the person who will now have to deliberate on the matter in non other than Speaker of the House Rebecca Kadaga who, although the Vice Chairperson of the NRM, is also the de facto leader of the rebel group, and is one of Museveni’s most outspoken critics. As if all of this doesn’t make the president’s task of silencing parliamentary criticism over oil difficult enough, Museveni is also faced with a resurgent opposition Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), who have been galvanized by the recent election of their new leader, Mugisha Muntu. <br />
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With real momentum now developing around the nascent oil sector, it is possible that production might now begin sooner rather than later (although exact predictions as to when exactly when this will be remain notoriously difficult to make). But whether this does signal a genuine shift towards economic nationalism in Uganda will depend very much on how the JBSF donors position themselves in the months ahead. Yet with China becoming increasingly influential in the country, and with Beijing increasingly being viewed by the government as their favoured ‘development partner’, a genuine shift in lines of influence is now possible. In the end, it may be an alliance of rebel government MPs and opposition members who are best placed to check the excesses of the Museveni executive for the foreseeable future.</div>
Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-34892178286968140702013-04-23T23:36:00.000-07:002013-05-06T00:24:14.356-07:00Rise of the Kingdoms<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
Since the start of this year, officials from the Kingdom of Bunyoro have been repeating calls for the creation of a ‘regional tier of government’ for their part of Uganda, and also claiming that this should receive up to 12.5% of all revenues from the region’s new oil fields (in the Albertine Graben) – once production starts. The demand is unlikely to be met by President Yoweri Museveni, but it nevertheless demonstrates just how emboldened the kingdom has become in its dealings with central government since major oil discoveries were first made in the area (in 2006). Following the discoveries, the government initially proposed an 80%-20% split in future oil revenues between the state and the districts from which the oil had come. Crucially, though, it was argued that as a ‘cultural institution’, the kingdom itself lay outside the formal structures of district administration, and was therefore initially entitled to nothing. </div>
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However, from that time onwards the kingdom and its allies have mounted a concerted lobbying campaign both in parliament – especially through regional MPs associated with the Bunyoro Parliamentary Caucus and the Greater North Parliamentary Forum – and in the media, and this has latterly forced the government’s hand. From mid-2009 onwards, Museveni has had to consult the kingdom on practically all regional matters, and he was eventually forced to concede on oil revenues as well. Thus, when the first new piece of oil legislation, the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Bill was finally passed – in December – it included provision for some of the monies to be paid to the kingdom as well. <br />
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However, kingdom supporters are now using this newfound political leverage to try to force<br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The Kingdom of Bunyoro</td></tr>
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concessions on various other issues as well, including on some which are not directly related to oil. For example, in April last year, Bunyoro officials lobbied the Ministry of Justice over the establishment of a regional justice centre in Hoima Town. In July, the King of Bunyoro himself, Solomon Gafabusa Iguru, met with the president at his official residence in Kirukura District, during which he pressed Museveni over state investments in regional education, health care, and road building projects. Then in October, kingdom supporters also played a leading part in getting the Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA), to release its long proposed plan for an upgrading of the main Kigumba-Masindi-Hoima-Kabwoya Road (one of the main thoroughfares through the region). Yet perhaps the biggest display of the kingdom’s new found confidence occurred in July, when Bunyoro officials sponsored a major fundraising event at the Ndere Centre in Kampala, which was attended by a broad swathe of the capital’s ethnic Banyoro elite. The event was both a celebration of cultural pride, but also an attempt to mobilize support for the kingdom’s ongoing efforts over oil revenues, and regional development in general. <br />
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The discovery of such large oil reserves within the kingdom’s historical territory has of course given particular impetus to Bunyoro’s recent political resurgence (current estimates put the reserves at least 3.5 billion barrels). However, jockeying over future petrodollars is only one of the factors that has led to the revival of the kingdom as a political force. Equally, if not more, important has been the effects of the Museveni government’s long-standing policy of ‘decentralization’ – which have fuelled the rise not only of Bunyoro, but of a number of other ‘traditional’ kingdoms (and other traditional authorities) in other parts of Uganda as well. <br />
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Decentralization has been the cornerstone of the Museveni government’s internal political policy since it came to power in 1986. Institutionalized through a range of legislation passed between 1987 and 1997, the system claims to increase popular participation, and improve accountability and service delivery. However, in recent years, a growing consensus has emerged that from the 2000s onwards, Museveni has also used decentralization – and the proliferation of local administrative structures that it allows for – as a kind of ‘divide and rule’ strategy, aimed at fragmenting political opposition throughout the country. For example, it is notable that when Museveni came to power, in 1986, Uganda had 22 districts, whereas today, it has 111 and one city (Kampala). <br />
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However, effective as this strategy has undoubtedly been in thwarting major opposition parties such as the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), it has also latterly spawned a generation of MPs who are more committed to local issues that to the political centre (for example, all of the younger rebel MPs who have challenged Museveni in recent times began their political careers in the local administration system). More generally, the proliferation of districts has generated more complex sub-national political landscapes. It is in this context, then, that ‘traditional’ authorities have latterly started to thrive. And this revival of kingdoms (and other traditional authorities besides) has been particularly marked in those places where the institutions involved have been able to mobilize local grievances over resource allocation – as Bunyoro has done in relation to oil. <br />
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Buganda is another traditional kingdom that has recently revived its political relevance by mobilizing grievances over resources. In one sense, the ‘Buganda question’ – the question of exactly how (by what institutional arrangements) the Kingdom of Buganda is incorporated into the Ugandan nation state, has been a vexed one from colonial times onwards. However, the issue has become politically charged again in recent years, as a result of decentralization. In Buganda’s case, the fragmentation of the kingdom’s historic territory into an ever greater number of separate districts initially weakened the ethnic Baganda elite’s sense of common purpose. In response, both kingdom officials, members of the Buganda parliament (the Lukiiko), and Baganda members of the national parliaments, lobbied intensively for increased powers for the kingdom, as the rightful ‘supra-district’ political entity in the central region. Museveni refused to grant these powers, but he did eventually concede to the creation of a separate ‘Buganda Council’ – to coordinate healthcare, education and infrastructure projects across districts – and he later talked about the creation of a ‘regional tier of government’ for Buganda as well (although to date, this has never been instituted).<br />
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However, since the mid-2000s, the kingdom has made its greatest gains over questions of land – gains which have ultimately resulted in Buganda becoming, once again, a key player in the national political landscape. The main catalyst here was Museveni’s new Land Act (which was passed in 1998, although was not implemented until several years later), which devolved all land claims down to newly created District Land Boards (DLBs, one of which was established for each new district in the country). One of the key effects was to divide a number of existing, and in some cases very long-standing, land disputes across multiple DLBs – effectively making it less likely that these claims would ever be settled. The kingdom itself had a particular stake in the problem, given that it is at the centre of the largest land dispute in Uganda (relating to 9000 square miles of land that were taken away from Buganda in 1969, yet which are still claimed by the Kingdom). However, its attempts to challenge the government on the Land Act resonated with a wide range of ethnic Baganda land owners, many of whom found that their claims were similarly divided across different districts (and this situation was relatively common, even for relatively small land owners). More generally, the kingdom’s attempts to present itself as the ‘defender of land’ also resonated with the wider Baganda public – even with those who owned very little, or even no, property at all – in the context of rapid population expansion in Kampala. Following attempts by the kingdom to further provoke the issue through its main radio station, CBS, the issue eventually resulted several days of rioting in and around the capital (in September 2009). </div>
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Recent years have also witnessed an attempt by elites associated with the former Kingdom of Ankole to<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-vqGac4aSOZs/UXd8RAaQF-I/AAAAAAAAAFs/bMkoBgiKBPM/s1600/Barigye.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="282" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-vqGac4aSOZs/UXd8RAaQF-I/AAAAAAAAAFs/bMkoBgiKBPM/s400/Barigye.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">John Patrick Barigye, self-proclaimed Ntare VI of Ankole before his death in October 2011</td></tr>
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re-establish their political relevance by mobilizing over resource issues. Ankole is in many ways the most controversial of Uganda’s former kingdoms, given that it was historically divided into two castes – an elite pastoralist caste (the Bahima), and a ‘commoner’ agricultural caste (the ‘Bairu’) – and was thus, in a sense, always divisive. Indeed, for this reason, it was the only one of the traditional kingdoms to not be reinstated by the Museveni government in 1986, and even today, it is still not officially recognized. Nevertheless, this has not stopped those associated with the current claimant to the Ankole throne, Charles Rwebishengye (son of the late John Patrick Barigye), from attempting to reinsert themselves in the region’s political affairs. In recent years, this group has mobilized under the umbrella of the Ankole Cultural Trust (ACT), which has again gained in popularity by assisting its members with land disputes and, more importantly, by providing a range of education scholarships to supporters’ children – especially in some of the poorer new districts in the Southwest. The success of these initiatives was demonstrated in August, when the ACT staged a huge fundraising event in the region capital, Mbarara, which was attended by all of the 200 most prominent clans in the region.</div>
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Recent developments have therefore highlighted the various ways in which Uganda’s ‘traditional kingdoms’ have now become a key part of the country’s increasingly complex national political landscape. Whilst kingdom elites remain unlikely to directly challenge President Museveni’s power in the short term, they may become more important players in the future, especially in the event of any radical shift in Uganda’s governing structures (a prospect that has become more plausible, in recent months, following talk of 'palace coups', and the like). Indeed, it was in order to check this potential rise in their influence that in 2010 the president tabled the Traditional Leaders’ Bill - which aimed to limit the powers of Uganda’s various monarchs (something that Museveni is technically already entitled to do, under article 246 of the constitution). However, as a further sign of the kingdoms’ political force, they were able to mobilize their supporters in parliament to have the more controversial clauses of that bill dropped.</div>
Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-2618991247390034232013-04-23T18:22:00.004-07:002013-04-23T23:40:25.160-07:00Museveni's Military MightIn February, a delegation of senior government officials from Mali visited Kampala, leading to speculation that Uganda may soon commit peacekeeping troops to that country. In December, the UN Security Council voted to create a new international peacekeeping force for the country, the African-led International Support Mission for Somalia (AFISMA), and it is now widely anticipated that Uganda may be looking to play a significant role within that. If Kampala does commit, it will give the Ugandan Army (UPDF) a military footprint in West Africa, in addition to its already extensive presence across large parts of the central and eastern continent.<br />
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In May last year, the UPDF and the US Army Africa (USARAF) co-hosted the second biennial African Land Forces Summit (ALFS) in Kampala. The stated aim of the meeting – which brought together army top-brass from 36 African nations – was to foster relationships between national armies, with a view to engendering future military co-operation (for example, in relation to regional security threats). However, for many commentators, the stated purpose of the conference was overshadowed by the symbolism of the event, which appeared to confirm Uganda’s rise as one of the pre-eminent military powers in Africa – something which has been very greatly assisted, in recent years, by US backing – at the same time as signalling future threats to the country (as characterized, in particular, by Sudan’s refusal to attend the summit). As such, it also raised important questions about the UPDF’s future role in Uganda’s own domestic political landscape, and about Kampala’s increasing use of its army as a primary tool of foreign policy, especially in the region.<br />
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In recent years, both the size of the UPDF, and the complexity of its organizational structure, have grown significantly. Following a mass recruitment of 9,000 new soldiers in late 2009, in August 2011, the army passed out a further 3,300 new troops, bringing the total number of regular forces to over 55,000. In addition, in March 2012, senior officers recalled 1,700 former soldiers, suggesting that, although the UPDF does not officially have a reserve force, it has greater numbers of men at its disposal than even this total would suggest (some estimated put the UPDF's unofficial reserves at around 10,000). Over the same period, President Museveni (who is also commander-in-chief of the UPDF), has undertaken a series of mass promotions among the UPDF officer class. For example, in January 2011, he promoted 208 middle-ranking officers. This was followed, in late September that year, by the promotion of 9 senior colonels to the rank of brigadier – the group included Museveni’s son, Kainerugaba Muhoozi, and also one woman, Proscovia Nalweyiso – and in April 2012, by the advancement of a further 204 middle ranking officers (most of whom moved from the rank of captain, to that of major). <br />
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Moreover, all of this also took place against a backdrop of increased military spending in the country. In a series of reports published from late 2011 onwards, a leading arms-control NGO, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), found that between the periods 2002-2006 and 2007-2011, Uganda’s arms imports increased by 300%. During 2006-11, Kampala imported 38,000 small arms and light weapons (nearly 20% of the total across Africa), whilst in 2011, Uganda’s total defence expenditure exceeded US$1 billion – by far the highest in the region. Certainly, these figures were inflated by Museveni’s 2010 decision to purchase 6 Su-30MK combat aircraft from Russia (which, although they are relatively old technology in global terms, will nevertheless eventually give Uganda one of the most advanced airforces in East and North-east Africa). However, recent reports have suggested that the UPDF’s spending is unlikely to stop there. In particular, rumours persist that the army has already bought, or else is about to buy, a range of new armour (although UPDF commanders have refused to comment on subject, arguing that the details of arms procurement are classified). <br />
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This rapid expansion of the UPDF since 2009 primarily reflects the growing role that the army now plays in Uganda’s domestic political landscape. With Museveni increasingly isolated within parliament – following a sustained challenge by a group of younger rebel MPs from within his own ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) – both he and the executive have become ever more reliant on the army as a means for quashing dissent. For example, in early September 2009, the president deployed the UPDF throughout Kampala in order to put down Baganda ethno-nationalist riots. In April 2011, the special forces group (SFG, which are headed by Kainerugaba Muhoozi) were similarly used to bring a series of opposition-led riots under control. And throughout early 2012, the UPDF were again active in relation to opposition leader Kizza Besigye’s ‘Walk to Work’ (W2W) campaigns. Elsewhere, Museveni has also become increasingly dependant upon the military as a means for strengthening state control over Uganda’s troubled Karamoja region (in the North-east of the country, and in which the UPDF’s 3rd and 5th divisions are currently based).<br />
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However, it is in relation to Uganda’s nascent oil sector that the president has become most reliant upon the army. From the time that significant oil deposits were discovered in the Lake Albert basin (from 2006 onwards), Museveni and his inner-circle have attempted to control the nascent oil fields by effectively militarizing the entire region in which they are located. Thus, following a series of cross-border skirmishes between the UPDF and the Congolese Army (FARDC), in 2009, Kampala announced construction of a new army base in Kyangwali Sub-county, Hoima District – which when complete, will be one of the biggest military installations in the country. In early 2010, Museveni then handed over security for all of the oil fields to his son’s SFG, whose duties include policing the ‘special permits’ which are now required for anyone – including elected officials – to access local populations. Moreover, the UPDF’s role in the oil sector is likely to expand once production begins in earnest, in a few years' time. <br />
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Yet even if Uganda’s current military expansion is driven primarily by domestic concerns, it would not have been possible were it not for Kampala’s commitment to ongoing military operations in Somalia. From the time the current African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) began, in January 2007 – with backing from the UN Security Council – Uganda has provided the lion’s share of troops for the mission, as well as much of its command-and-control structures. Indeed, following al-Shabaab’s bombings in Kampala in July 2010, Uganda has recently increased its overall commitment to the mission, to 8,000 troops.<br />
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The key point though is that prior to the UPDF becoming involved in Somalia, Uganda’s overall military expenditure was effectively capped by the donor community. Throughout the late 1990s, and early 2000s, the World Bank and Britain’s Department for International Development (DfID), in particular, put sustained pressure on Museveni and his executive to limit defence spending as a percentage of their overall budget – even in the context of (then) expanding military operations against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the north of the country. However, following the creation of the AMISOM mission, any such spending limits have effectively been lifted, with the US, the UK and the EU all contributing to the costs of the intervention. The US, in particular, has already spent US $550 million on military training and equipment for the Somalia force, and much of this has gone directly to Uganda. For example, since 2007, American military contractors have operated a training camp for Somalia-bound UPDF troops at Kakola (about 50 miles northeast of Kampala), which in May 2012 passed out 3,500 men. In addition, since 2007, Uganda has received other forms of military support from the US besides (i.e. over and above that which they have received specifically for AMISOM). Most notably, in October 2011, President Obama deployed 100 US Army Special Forces (Green Berets) to assist in the UPDF in their hunt for LRA leader Joseph Kony. <br />
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Moreover, all of this has also given Museveni renewed confidence in using the army as a primary means for achieving various of Uganda’s other foreign policy objectives across the region. For example, it has resulted in the Ugandan president reinvigorating the UPDF’s operations in North-eastern Congo and the Southern Central African Republic (CAR) to capture Kony and his men. These operations had been ‘running out of steam’ a little, especially in light of more pressing domestic concerns. However, in the context of Uganda’s renewed military strength – and again, with additional US support – in March last year the UPDF announced that it would form the majority of a new brigade-strong AU force against the LRA. Moreover, following its creation, the new structure almost immediately proved a success, when in May, a UPDF patrol captured a senior LRA commander, Caesar Acellam, near to the DRC-CAR border.</div>
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Recent months have also seen a ratcheting-up of the Ugandan government’s rhetoric regarding the current conflict between South Sudan and Sudan. Having supported the Southern People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) from the mid-1980s onwards, Uganda remains a staunch ally of (the now independent) South Sudan, and could thus be expected to be draw into the conflict on Juba’s side. Moreover, this possibility became increasingly real last year, when the Sudanese Ambassador to Uganda Amb Hussein Awadi claimed that Kampala had been providing covert support to rebel groups in Darfur. Reflecting Uganda's new military strength, Kampala's response to these claims has been notably robust. Thus, following the Sudanese Ambassador’s comments, Security Minister Wilson Mukasa refuted the allegations, but also said that Uganda was well capable of repelling a Sudanese attack, and thus had nothing to fear from such an eventuality. Kampala has also been similarly blasé about the possibility of future armed conflict with Egypt over ongoing disputes over ownership and control of water in the River Nile. Indeed, at the time he announced the purchase of the Su-30MK aircraft to his cabinet, Museveni claimed that the new jets would ensure victory over Egypt in the event of any such war.</div>
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President Museveni is likely to become increasingly reliant on the UPDF as a tool for quelling domestic opposition in the months and years ahead. He is also likely to deepen their engagement in various theatres of conflict throughout the region, and across the continent. Kenya remains Uganda’s primary ally, and relations between Kigali and Kampala are at an all time high. Therefore armed conflict with either of those states is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. However, the UPDF’s engagement in North-eastern Congo is likely to continue, and to expand, for many months to come, whilst the potential for renewed conflict with Sudan grows all the time.</div>
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Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-49552966127308077022012-11-11T01:00:00.002-08:002013-04-23T23:41:04.547-07:00Review- Ghosts of Kanungu (African Affairs)The latest edition of African Affairs (Vol. 111, No. 445: 673-675) carries a review of my book <i>Ghosts of Kanungu: Fertility, secrecy and exchange in the Great Lakes of East Africa </i>(James Currey, 2009). The review is written by Professor Richard Fardon from SOAS, University of London:<br />
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Richard Vokes has written a compelling account of the tragic events that hindsight suggests were to culminate in 2000 with the deaths of some hundreds of members of the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandmants of God (MRTC) in the south-west of Uganda. <br />
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Ethnographic monographs on Africa, whatever their other virtues, can rarely be described as riveting from first to last, but this one is. Its achievement is to explain the concatenation of events around the demise of the MRTC without foreclosing every doubt about the exact nature of those events. We shall never know with certainty what happened in March 2000, but Vokes has worked tirelessly to derive a plausible narrative by placing the documented events in the context of the various forces – of the past and the present, the relatively local and global –working upon them. <br />
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The book opens with the scenario as it appeared to a newcomer – as Vokes then was – and closes by revisiting the same scenes in the light of eight years of investigation. A fire in a building at the headquarters of the MRTC in Kanungu immolates many of its surviving members. As well as the remains of a last meal, a wall calendar is found that laconically records for 16 March 2000 ‘world’s end’, and for 17 March ‘bye’. Vokes, who had arrived earlier that month intending research in south-west Uganda, caught the news item on CNN in Kampala. From the outset, media, police, politicians, and so forth began to apply different glosses to what had taken place. Initially in Kanungu, then in the following days at other MRTC properties, investigators discovered mass graves, some of them simply bodies tipped into pit latrines. What mixture of murder or cult suicide might explain this? The answer involves our retracing the history of this ‘African-Initiated Church’ (AIC) to learn about its antecedents, expansion, teaching, and demise. <br />
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Historical reinterpretation is needed for one set of antecedents to become apparent. The Nyabingi cult appears in records of the colonial period primarily as a movement of resistance. Vokes argues that this was only one guise adopted by a network of relations, exchanges, and initiatory knowledge that sought to redress misfortunes, particularly infertility in narrow and broad senses. The MRTC took part of its template from Nyabingi, one reason for the MRTC being unusually secretive for an AIC. Between Nyabingi and the MRTC stood a historical mediator in the shape of Roman Catholicism. The White Fathers were distinctive and successful, at least vis-à-vis the Church Missionary Society, for reasons that included both their practical attempts to improve the lives of their parishioners, and their advocacy of the protective role of the Virgin Mary, particularly in women’s affairs. Nyabingi, as one informant put it, became a Catholic, and in the process also became anthropomorphized. With the retirement of the last overseas missionaries, the Church passed into local hands, and Africanizing initiatives were encouraged after Vatican II. <br />
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The central figure of the drama, Ceredonia Mwerinde, was visited by the Virgin Mary at a site particularly associated with Nyabingi in its guise of anti-colonial struggle. Over time these visions began to specify a whole style of life and of worship. Adherents set up their own sites of worship and residence, the MRTC being eventually expelled from the Catholic Church, taking some clerics with it. Growth of MRTC as an AIC correlated with the worst onset of AIDS, and its adherents were largely drawn from those most marginalized, particularly young AIDS widows in polygamous households, possibly descendants of migrants, as well as other women at risk economically. What property they retained was made over to the MRTC in expectation of security. Meanwhile, under the influence of international Marian contacts, the leadership of the MRTC turned increasingly to preoccupation with the doctrines of the final days. Illness, particularly malaria, broke out in the cramped collective dwellings; drought led to hunger approaching starvation; and, as they died, increasingly the group cut themselves off. The end was mostly likely suicide by poison, the dead engulfed by a fire set by the last to die.<br />
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What is so compelling about Vokes’s account is the sense of forces and events conspiring together towards tragedy. Along the way, Richard Vokes generalizes theoretically and methodologically for his anthropological readers likely to be interested in such things, but these passages are neither extended nor obtrusive (whether or not they are necessary) and readers of this journal will not find they obscure the narrative thrust. This is amongst the outstanding Africanist ethnographies of recent years: a splendid combination of ethnographic investigation with the evaluation of texts and images, and a significant addition to the literature on African-initiated Churches.<br />
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For more on the book, visit the Kanungu project website, which is available <a href="http://richardvokes.net/kanungu.shtml" target="_blank">here</a>.<br />
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Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-4064422597827297082012-08-07T17:55:00.000-07:002012-08-09T15:15:27.225-07:00Publication- Photography in Africa: Ethnographic Perspectives<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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I have just published my latest edited collection, called 'Photography in Africa: Ethnographic Perspectives' (James Currey, 2012). Full details of the publication can be viewed at the publisher's website <a href="http://www.jamescurrey.com/store/viewItem.asp?idProduct=13873" target="_blank">here</a>, and the book can also be purchased at Amazon.co.uk <a href="http://www.amazon.co.uk/Photography-Africa-Ethnographic-Richard-Vokes/dp/1847010458/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1344311407&sr=8-1" target="_blank">here</a> (or Amazon.com <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Photography-Africa-Ethnographic-Richard-Vokes/dp/1847010458/ref=sr_1_13?ie=UTF8&qid=1344311439&sr=8-13&keywords=photography+in+africa" target="_blank">here</a>).<br />
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The collection includes a series of empirically rich historical and ethnographic case studies, which examine the variety of ways in which photographs are produced, circulated, and engaged with across a range of social contexts. The volume includes examples drawn from across the continent, and from each of Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone Africa. In this way, it elucidates the distinctive characteristics of all African photographic practices and cultures, vis-à-vis those of other types of 'vernacular photography' worldwide. In addition, the studies included here also develop a reflexive turn, by examining the history of academic engagement with these African photographic cultures, and by reflecting on the distinctive qualities of the ethnographic method as a means for studying such phenomena.<br />
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The volume critically engages current debates in African photography and visual anthropology. First, it extends our understanding of the variety of ways in which both colonial and post-colonial states in Africa have used photography as a means for establishing, and projecting, their authority. Second, it moves discussion of African photography away from an exclusive focus on the role of the 'the studio' and looks at the circulations through which the studios' products - the photographs themselves - later pass as artefacts of material culture. Last, it makes an important contribution to our understanding of the relationship between photography and ethnographic research methods, as these have been employed in Africa.<br />
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In addition, the book pay particular attention to the fast changing nature of African photographic cultures, especially since the arrival of widespread digital imaging technologies. For example, to take my own field site of South-western Uganda, it is interesting to note that although digital technologies have only become available in significant numbers since around 2009, they have already begun to generate keen discussion, across a wide variety of social contexts. Thus, even in settings in which people are not yet entirely familiar with digital imaging technologies, people are already beginning to debate, for example, what impact pre-natal scan images will have upon concepts of personhood (in a context in which practically any reference to an unborn child is regarded as strictly taboo), what effect digital portraits will have upon exchange relations (in a context in which photographic image-objects play a significant part in many types of exchange relationships), and what impact the advent of Facebook, and other social networking sites, will have upon relations between people ‘back home’ and those now living in the Diaspora.<br />
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I recently conducted an interview about the new collection with the editor of <i>African Griot</i>. The interview provides further information about the volume, and some background on the genesis of the project. The full text of the interview can be viewed <a href="https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B4bb98gdynquaFNLaDIyWWtxcFU/edit" target="_blank">here</a>.</div>
</div>Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-32477756901497327872012-08-06T20:35:00.000-07:002012-08-07T18:08:43.083-07:00LRA Update<div>
During last Friday's whistle-stop visit to Uganda, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton refused to be drawn on any questions relating to the hunt for Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Nevertheless, over recent months, a number of details have begun to emerge about both the pattern, and the progress, of the operation. In particular, in late May, the US Army's Special Operations Command in Africa (SOCAFRICA) provided the first update on its own deployment of 100 Green Berets to the region (who having arrived in the field in November last year, are acting as military advisers to various regional armies). The update confirmed a number of important details, including the fact that the US Special Forces, despite being primarily based in Entebbe, Uganda, have established a number of forward operating bases ('Combined Operations Fusion Centres') in areas of LRA activity: the borderlands between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan. The SOCAFRICA statement also claimed some initial successes for the US deployment, arguing that it has already assisted regional armies to improve their tracking and pursuit of LRA elements, and has thus enabled them to increase the pressure on Kony’s men. Indeed, the US statement even went as far as to say that as a result of the new joint operations, the LRA has now been reduced to ‘survival mode’ only. </div>
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When President Obama first announced the Green Berets’ deployment in mid-October, many commentators initially dismissed the move as largely symbolic, and as aimed primarily at assuaging US-based anti-LRA lobby groups. In particular, the operation was criticized for being based out of Entebbe - which is several hundred miles away from the DRC-CAR-South Sudan border zone - for the somewhat passive role in which it cast the US troops (at the time, US Assistant Secretary of Defence Alexander Vershbow was keen to stress that the Green Berets would not directly engage the LRA, but would instead act only as trainers and advisors to regional militaries), and for its ‘time-limited’ mandate. In addition, the deployment looked unlikely to achieve much in a context in which the Ugandan Army (UPDF) – who had been the primary trackers of Kony’s men in recent years – were beginning to draw down their own anti-LRA operation, in light of growing fatigue and indiscipline amongst its expeditionary force, and due to the UPDF’s growing commitments elsewhere. <br />
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However, in recent months both the US deployment, and the regional military efforts that this is designed to assist, have received a major fillip from the enormous public and NGO response to Invisible Children’s ‘KONY 2012’ campaign video. Specifically, the huge amount of interest that the video has generated – which following its uploading to YouTube in early March, has been viewed over 92 million times – has done much to galvanize US policy-makers, in particular, into developing a more robust response to the LRA crisis. Moreover, these efforts have fared well with a White House administration keen to demonstrate its own tough stance on foreign policy matters in the run-up to November’s presidential election. It is in this context, then, that in late April President Obama made a speech at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, in Washington DC, in which he indicated that the Green Berets’ mission was to be both expanded, and extended (and in relation to the latter, he explicitly removed the former ‘time-limit’ on the operation). Since then, the US force, although continuing to avoid any direct engagements with the LRA, has also become more active in the field, especially in the area of intelligence gathering (and SOCAFRICA's recent statement also stated that the US are now planning to increase its surveillance overflights of the LRA-effected areas as well). The public response to KONY 2012 has also helped to galvanize Kampala into renewed action against the rebel group. Thus, in late March, President Museveni announced that the UPDF would be contributing the lion’s share of troops to a new 5,000 strong African Union (AU) force to take on the LRA. Although details of the AU mission have yet to be finalized, this will likely involve both a reallocation of the 1,500 or so Uganda soldiers currently based in the LRA-affected areas, and a further UPDF deployment to the zone. For its part, the Congolese Army (FARDC) had already deployed their elite, and US-trained, 391st Battalion to the LRA-affected areas in order to bolster their own efforts against Kony’s men. At the time of their deployment, in April 2011, the 391st Battalion replaced former units of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) who although formerly integrated into the FARDC, largely operate outside of its command and control structures. But since early March, these troops have become much more active in their anti-LRA activities, and have received additional anti-insurgency training from the Green Beret trainers (at a UN Stabilization Mission in the Congo, MONUSCO, Operations Centre in Dungu Town, in Haut-Uele District). In all of these ways, then, it is worth noting that Invisible Children’s campaign, whatever its other shortcomings, has been highly successful in achieving its primary objective, of achieving an expanded US operation in Central Africa, in support of regional militaries’ own anti-LRA efforts.<br />
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Moreover, over recent months, all of this reinvigorated military activity has resulted in a number of significant successes. For example, when on 10th March, a detachment of LRA fighters tried to attack a village along the road between Dungu and Faradje Town, they were repelled by an FARDC patrol (who also killed 2 LRA cadres in the process, and recovered a number of weapons). However, even better was to come in on 12th May, when another group of 30 LRA fighters was ambushed by a UPDF patrol on the banks of the River Mbou (on the CAR side of the border with the DRC). In the ensuing exchanges, the Ugandans captured 3 of the rebel fighters – among them one of the LRA’s most senior commanders, and one of Kony’s most trusted aides, Maj.-Gen. Caesar Achellam Otto. Subsequent accounts of Achellam’s arrest were somewhat confused on the question of whether the ambush and capture had been a chance event, or whether it was the result of an intelligence-led operation. In addition, at least one commentator, Angelo Izama, of the Kampala-based NGO Fanaka Kwawote, suggested that Achellam may have even handed himself in – having been seen as a potential defector for several years now (and the relatively comfortable conditions in which the Maj.-Gen. has been held since his arrest may be further evidence that such a deal had indeed been done). Nevertheless, whatever the circumstances of Achellam’s capture, there is little doubt the arrest has done much to further the impression that the net is indeed now closing on Joseph Kony himself. <br />
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Yet whether all of this means that the LRA really has indeed now been reduced to ‘survival mode’ remains unclear. Certainly, recent months have also seen the group narrow its area of operations. Thus, although Kony himself may now be in Darfur, and at least some of his men remain in the CAR, since the turn of the year most of his group’s 200 or so remaining fighters have been concentrated in a relatively narrow corridor running roughly west-east from Bangadi Town, through Dungu, to Faradje, in North-eastern DRC. Moreover, although these fighters (who now operate in cells of between 3-30 men) have continued to carry out large numbers of attacks against civilian populations, recent predations have involved much lower levels of violence that has become the norm in recent years. For example, in 33 LRA attacks carried out in North-eastern DRC between Jan-March 2012, 3 civilian deaths were recorded. Most of the attacks appear to have been orientated towards the looting of supplies, rather than to the abduction of additional fighters (as would have been the case until just a few months ago). However, whether this narrowing of territory, and reduction in levels of LRA violence, can be seen as a result of external pressure being brought to bear on the rebel group – through more effective patrolling of surrounding areas, and a stifling of supply lines – remains unclear. Certainly, this is the story that both SOCAFRICA and the UPDF are keen to promulgate to the world’s media. Yet it is just as likely that these developments are instead an outcome of tactical decisions made by Joseph Kony himself – perhaps made in the context of last September’s ‘council of war’ of senior LRA commanders (held in the CAR) – both to concentrate his remaining force in the dense forests around Dungu, and to try to gain the support of surrounding populations there (which will become more important over time, especially if the LRA remain in Haut-Uele for an extended period of time).<br />
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As US intelligence gathering gains pace, and as regional military efforts become more coordinated, both as a result of US training, and in line with the AU’s new plan, pressure on the LRA will certainly increase. However, with the possibility of further material support from Khartoum – who continue to view the LRA as a useful proxy against the South Sudanese Army (SPLA) and the UPDF – Kony may decide to ‘bide his time’, by simply ‘bedding down’ his force in the least accessible parts of Haut-Uele until the current challenges have passed. Certainly, this sort of tactic has worked very well for him in the past. However, whilst this development might bode well for local civilian populations in the short term, it will also do little to diminish the LRA’s overall, and ongoing, capacity for violence.</div>
</div>Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-36509642608748135912012-05-24T15:47:00.002-07:002012-08-07T17:58:15.176-07:00Museveni's latest woesRecent weeks have again highlighted that President Yoweri Museveni faces steadily rising criticism of his leadership both from within the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM), and from outside it. In late April, a group of 20 Ugandan MPs (including NRM members) announced plans to launch a private member’s bill aimed at re-introducing presidential term limits in Uganda. This was followed, a week later, by Captain Francis Babu, a member of the NRM's National Executive Committee (NEC), trying to place the same issue on the agenda of a high-level party meeting in Kampala. Although both moves ultimately proved unsuccessful – government whips effectively quashed the proposed new bill even before it was tabled, and Babu’s agenda item was eventually ruled ‘out of order’ – the moves have once again highlight just how vulnerable the president has now become. Then, earlier this month, Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi once again came under pressure to step down as Secretary-General of the NRM - in a move which can also be seen as an indirect attack on the president. Moreover, this internal pressure on Museveni is being compounded by a stubborn opposition, and by their long-running public demonstration movement.<br />
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For several years now, Museveni has faced a growing challenge from a body of younger NRM MPs who, distrustful both of him and his party executive, have sought to check the president’s powers. During 2011, these ‘young turks’ dealt Museveni a number of setbacks, especially in relation to the country’s nascent oil sector. For example, in October 2011, the group supported the tabling in parliament of documents which purported to show that the then Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa had received a US$16.5 million bribe from Ireland’s Tullow Oil. Although the documents were proved to be fake, they nevertheless became a catalyst for Kutesa’s subsequent resignation. In recent months, the young rebels have continued to keep up their pressure on the president and his inner-circle.</div>
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For example, in early February, the group organized a petition calling for the resignation of Minister of Gender Syda Bbumba and Minister for General Duties in the Office of the Prime Minister Khiddu Makubya, over the role that the two had played in the payment of compensation, of around US$70 million, to NEC member Hassan Basajjabalaba over the loss of his public contracts for the redevelopment of several markets, and other public spaces, in central Kampala (at the time the payments were made, Bbumba and Makubya had been Finance Minister, and Auditor-General, respectively). Further pressure was then brought to bear on the two through the Public Accounts Committee, who on 16th February, formally censured the pair – following which both ministers did resign. Also in February, another of the younger NRM MPs, David Bahati, re-introduced his controversial Anti-homosexuality Bill (albeit with its former provision for the death penalty – for acts of ‘aggravated homosexuality’ – now removed). President Museveni remains opposed to the bill, having issued an executive order against it in late 2009. Nevertheless, on the day that Bahati tabled the revised version in the house, he received widespread applause from the NRM members present. Then, in mid-April, members of the young turks, this time working through Parliamentary Appointments Committee, were again involved in trying to force the resignation of Minister of Internal Affairs Hilary Onek. Onek had been previously implicated in the same corruption scandal that led to Kutesa’s resignation – although on that occasion, he managed to hold on to his position. However, the latest controversy relates to a claim that he had lied about his academic qualifications when first joining parliament, by inventing both Masters and PhD degrees from Uganda’s Makerere University. If upheld, this claim will almost certainly force Onek to step down. </div>
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As a result of these developments, President Museveni is today more politically isolated than he has been for many years, and he is increasingly reliant on his loyalist Prime Minister, Amama Mbabazi. However, Mbabazi has also been the subject of a corruption scandal in recent months - and he is anyway never far from controversy - and this has further deepened the president’s current political predicament. Thus, were Mbabazi himself to also fall foul of one of the rebel MPs’ parliamentary manoeuvres in the months ahead, then this would leave Museveni very dangerously exposed. <br />
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For its part, the opposition Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), which is now part of the umbrella-organization Activists for Change (A4C), have done their best to exploit the president’s current weakness. Following his relaunch of the ‘Walk to Work’ (W2W) campaign in mid-January, in recent months opposition leader Kizza Besigye has held an ever greater number of A4C rallies, especially in and around Kampala. However, with the authorities remaining hostile to the group, many of these rallies have become increasingly violent in nature. </div>
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For example, on 21st February, riot police fired tear gas to disperse the crowd at an A4C rally in Katwe Market, Central Kampala. In the confusion that followed, Besigye’s bodyguard, Francis Mwijukye, was hit with a rubber bullet, whilst Besigye himself was hit in the leg by a tear gas canister (he was later hospitalized). In the same incident, FDC Women’s League Chairperson Ingrid Turinawe was sprayed in the face with pepper spray. Four days later, police again fired tear gas at an A4C rally held in Kasangati Town (which lies 9 miles north of the capital). That action resulted in widespread rioting, during which several buildings in the town were torched, and at least 8 people, including a 7-month old baby, were injured. However, worse was to follow on 21st March, when another A4C rally in central Kampala again descended into chaos. In the resulting melee, rocks were thrown at police, resulting in the death of a senior officer, Assistant Inspector of Police John Michael Ariong. 12 senior FDC officials, including Besigye himself, were arrested at the scene, along with several dozen of the group’s supporters. The opposition leader was later released on bail (although with restrictions on his movement), whilst at least 10 people were later charged with the policeman’s death, and with various public order offences relating to the incident. A week later, on 31st March, Besigye was again arrested, this time for breaching his bail conditions, as he attempted to reach another A4C rally in Kasangati. During the arrest, an NBS TV journalist who was covering the incident was hit by a police vehicle, and sustained serious injuries. <br />
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In response to the growing unrest, on 4th April, Attorney-General Peter Nyombi invoked Section 56 of the Penal Code Act to ban A4C as an ‘unlawful society’. The move was seen by many as unusual, given that in recent years Section 56 (which is an old colonial law) has only been invoked in relation to religious cults, and not in reference to large-scale political organizations. In this sense, Besigye himself was probably correct in his later assessment that the Attorney-General’s move demonstrated just how seriously the authorities are now taking the opposition threat. </div>
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However, the formal banning of A4C seems unlikely to lead to a decline in the opposition’s protests, at least in the short term. Just one day after the ban came into effect, Besigye held another rally at the Kololo Independence Grounds, in Kampala. On 18th April, the opposition leader – along with Kampala Lord Mayor Erias Lukwago (who is another senior figure within the A4C organization) – then attempted another protest at Nakasero Market. Although Besigye and Lukwago claimed that they were only trying to have lunch at the market, the authorities barred the pair’s entry into the site, and this once again resulting in violence. In the ensuing fracas, a number of people, including a 12-year old girl, were injured. Finally, on 20th April, Ingrid Turinawe was arrested as she attempted to reach an opposition rally just outside the capital. In a strange twist, TV footage of the arrest clearly showed a male riot policeman gripping Turinawe’s right breast as she was pulled out of her vehicle. The footage resulted in complaints from human- and women’s- rights organizations, and subsequently led to female FDC supporters protesting topless in central Kampala (for which they were also arrested). The policeman involved was eventually suspended for his actions. <br />
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Footage of Turinawe's arrest can be seen here...<br />
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...whilst footage of the subsequent protests can be viewed here:<br />
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However, the ability of the opposition to move beyond these isolated incidents of unrest, and to develop a coherent opposition platform from which to challenge Museveni, has been significantly restricted in recent months by the emergence of a major leadership battle within the FDC. Following Besigye’s announcement that he would step down at party leader in June, intense jockeying has been taking place within the organization over who will succeed him. To date, at least three major contenders have emerged, including leader of the opposition in parliament Nathan Nandala-Mafabi, FDC heavyweight MP Abdu Katuntu, and long-time Besigye challenger Major-General Mugisha Muntu. In recent times, competition between these three figures has served only to deepen divisions within the FDC. However, it is also intriguing to note that both Nandala-Mafabi and Katuntu have also spent recent months developing their alliances among the NRM young turks: Nandala-Mafabi, by drawing on links made during his former Chairmanship of the Public Accounts Committee (the same committee which recently forced the resignations of Ministers Bbumba and Makubya), Katuntu, through his own attempts to check the executive’s powers in relation to oil (for example, in December, Katuntu curried favour with many NRM rebels by taking the Attorney-General to the constitutional court over confidentiality clauses contained in several of the oil Production Sharing Agreements, PSAs). The growth of these alliances is intriguing, because it suggests that in the event of either Nandala-Mafabi or Katuntu taking over in June, an entirely new sort of opposition configuration might begin to emerge in parliament – one that would surely be powerful enough to signficantly restrict the president’s powers. <br />
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Museveni remains safe for now, and will probably continue to be so for as long as his political fixer-in-chief, Amama Mbabazi, remains in place. However, with Uganda’s economy performing badly (inflation is currently running at just over 20%, and in April the IMF lowered its growth forecast for 2012 from 5.5% to 4.2%) discontent will continue to grow throughout the country. In consequence, groups such as A4C – who recently tried to bypass the ban by relaunching themselves as For God and My Country (4GC) – will continue to draw big crowds at their rallies. However, whether such anger can be converted into a sustained drive for political change in the country remains to be seen.</div>
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</div>Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-38860637058308064872012-03-09T02:08:00.000-08:002013-04-23T23:39:52.719-07:00'KONY 2012', and a military solution to the LRA crisis<div>
On 2nd March, the US advocacy group Invisible Children posted a 30 min campaign video for their new campaign 'KONY 2012', on the video sharing website Vimeo. Following its transfer to YouTube as well, the film quickly became an internet phenomenon. As a result of its circulation on social networking sites such as Facebook, between Tuesday 6th March and Thursday 8th, the video had been viewed over 21 million times. As of the time of writing, the film's YouTube page records more than 46 million hits (for anyone who hasn't yet seen the film, there is a link to it at the end of this post).</div>
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The film focuses on Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and implores its imagined US audience to lobby for a military response to Kony's crimes (i.e. to pressure the US government to expand its current military deployment in LRA-affected areas, with a view to arresting Kony). Although it is terribly self-indulgent (on the part of Invisible Children founder Jason Russell), the film is a very slick polemic, more in the style of a Michael Moore documentary rather than a traditional piece of investigative journalism. As such, it relies more on an appeal to emotion - the shock and anger that any rational viewer will feel when confronted with images of Kony's crimes - rather than on a balanced assessment of facts, in its attempt to persuade viewers to join the campaign. As a result, detail goes out of the window, with the entire history of the LRA being reduced to only the actions and intentions of Kony himself, and with the only issue emerging from the 25-year long insurgency being that of child soldiers - both gross over-simplifications (to say the least). In addition, the complexities of the USA's relations with the International Criminal Court (ICC) - in which an arrested Kony would presumably be tried - are never referred to, of course. Nevertheless, the film has been an enormous internet hit.</div>
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In the short period of time since KONY 2012 'went viral' a great deal has already been written about the film, both in traditional media outlets, and in the 'blogsphere' (for an example of the former, see the coverage in the <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/kony-2012" target="_blank">Guardian</a>, for an entry point into the latter, see this digest, published on <a href="http://www.whydev.org/a-readers-digest-of-kony-2012/" target="_blank">whydev.org</a>). Whilst much of what has been written so far has responded positively to the film, a large number of sources have also been highly critical of the documentary, and of Invisible Children's motives for making it. For example, across the acres of text that have already been generated in response to the video, very many commentators have already raised concerns over everything from the charity's very style of 'celebrity humanitarianism', to its financial accounts (Invisible Children's own response to these charges can be found <a href="http://www.invisiblechildren.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/critiques.html" target="_blank">here</a>). However, by far the greatest criticism of KONY 2012 has been of its central thesis; that the best way to deal with Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is through <i>military</i> intervention, and that this will have the greatest chance of success if carried out in partnership with the Ugandan Army (UPDF). On the one hand, both journalists and bloggers appear to be quite shocked by the very notion that an humanitarian advocacy group such as Invisible Children should be pushing for any form of military engagement at all - given that all forms of violence are apparently at odds with the very ideals of humanitarianism (and this certainly wasn't helped by the subsequent emergence on a number of websites of a rather goofy photograph of Jason Russell and some of his co-founders posing with weapons and soldiers of the Sudan People's Liberation Army, SPLA; see <a href="http://whitthef.wordpress.com/2012/03/07/kony-2012/" target="_blank">here</a>). On the other hand, commentators are also appalled by the idea that international forces should work alongside the UPDF, given that army's own poor human rights record. </div>
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So what then should we make of KONY 2012, and of these criticisms of the film? Perhaps the first point to make is that there is in fact nothing particularly new in what Invisible Children are advocating for here. Thus, over recent months a growing consensus has emerged - among both advocacy groups and (more importantly) policy makers - around the necessity for renewed military action against the LRA. For example, as the film describes, following the signing into law of the US<i> Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act (</i>in May 2010), in October President Obama authorized the deployment of 100 combat-ready Army Special Forces (Green Berets) to the Great Lakes region, to assist in the hunt for Joseph Kony and his men. This was followed, in early November, by an announcement from the German Ambassador to Uganda, Klaus Duxmann, that the EU was ready commit both troops and money to a renewed fight. A few weeks later, the African Union (AU) then officially launched its own 'authorized mission’ against Kony, which aims to eventually coordinate all military action against the rebel group. Finally, in early December, an 11-country UN Committee on security in Central Africa met in Bangui, in the Central African Republic (CAR), with a view to also expanding the UN's involvement in future anti-LRA operations. </div>
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Moreover, it is clear that if any of these initiatives are to be successful, they will require the involvement of the UPDF. Certainly, the Green Berets <i>may</i> have the capacity to not arrest, but to actually kill, Joseph Kony himself. Following Obama’s announcement of the Special Forces operation, a number of commentators initially dismissed the operation as largely symbolic (an impression that was apparently then confirmed by a statement from Assistant Secretary of Defence Alexander Vershbow, that a majority of the Special Forces would in fact be based in Kampala, and would act primarily as advisors to other regional armies). However, the deployment is more than a token gesture, not least because the troops involved are under the Special Operations Command in Africa (SOCAFRICA). In recent years, SOCAFRICA have proved highly successful in tracking down remote targets in the Horn of Africa (a region over which they took responsibility in 2008). In addition, they have access to a wide array of high-tech assets, many of which are specifically designed to target mobile subjects (and it is already being reported from Haut-Uele in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC – where a majority of LRA fighters are currently based – that the number of surveillance overflights in the region have increased dramatically in recent months). Thus, the plan will presumably be to try to get a 'fix' on Kony - using either an insider source, or some sort of electronic tag - and to then hit him with a drone. Indeed, it is probably with this in mind that from mid-November onwards, members of the Green Berets deployment have been making regular trips to the DRC-Central African Republic (CAR) border area on various ‘fact-finding’ missions.</div>
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Nevertheless, if the US deployment is going to contribute to any wider success - in terms reducing the overall size of the LRA force, and in diminishing the threat that they pose (with or without Kony at their head) - it is going to have to work through regional armies, and (like it or not) this really means the UPDF. This is because other national armies in the region are currently over-engaged elsewhere. For example, the Congolese Army (FARDC) are currently tied up with post-election difficulties in other parts of their vast country, following the contested general elections of December last year. Similarly, the army of South Sudan (SPLA) are engaged in serious conflicts of their own, whilst t<span class="Apple-style-span" style="background-color: #cccccc;">he national army of the CAR</span> also has its focus elsewhere. The other only significant military actor in the region, the UN's Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) simply doesn't have the capacity to mount sustained operations against Kony and his men. For these, and other, reasons, the UPDF have been the primary trackers of the LRA throughout Eastern DRC, and beyond, ever since the start of ‘Operation Lightening Thunder’ (later renamed ‘Rudia II’) in December 2008 – an operation to which the US also provided over US$38 million in logistical support - and this situation is unlikely to change any time soon. </div>
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However, one major problem here is that following a series of difficulties with Lightening Thunder/Rudia II, in mid-2010 the Ugandans began to significantly draw-down the numbers of soldiers they had engaged in LRA-affected areas. Today, less than half their original 4,000 troops who started Lightening Thunder still remain. In addition, recent reports have pointed to a growing sense of fatigue, and increased indiscipline, amongst those who are still there. For example, in late 2010, President Bozize expelled the UPDF from Sam Ouandja, in North-eastern CAR, following accusations of illegal diamond mining in the area. Throughout 2011, FARDC officers have made similar allegations against Ugandan forces in Haut-Uele – although to date, they have not produced any evidence to substantiate their claims. But in mid-June, concrete evidence did emerge of UPDF troops in South Sudan engaging in illegal transportation practices. </div>
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Moreover, the Ugandan Army currently has its own burgeoning commitments elsewhere. In particular, Uganda remains in command of, and continues to provide the largest share of the troops for, the African Union’s Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Indeed, the UPDF’s existing deployment of 5210 soldiers in Somalia is set to rise by a further 50% in 2012, in line with a commitment President Museveni made following the al-Shabaab bombings in Kampala in July 2010. In addition, much of Uganda’s own elite Special Forces Group – which is under the command of Museveni’s son Lt. Col. Kainerugaba Muhoozi – is now engaged in securitization work in and around Uganda’s new oil fields in the Albertine Rift Valley (which, despite the impression given in some of the coverage that has followed the release of KONY 2012, is in fact quite some distance away from the LRA's current areas of operation). Finally, during last year’s Ugandan general election campaign, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni promised an additional deployment of troops to Karamoja, in Northeast Uganda – in line with his long standing policy of using the army as a primary means for improving security in that region as well. In this context, then, the LRA may in fact be a lessening priority for the UPDF at this time. </div>
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However, perhaps the key issue here, and the one that critics of KONY 2012 are really driving at, is what sort of 'moral hazard' any renewed military operations - be they attempts to 'decapitate' the LRA, or wider operations against the group - might generate, in the form of reprisals against surrounding civilian populations. At present, the LRA continue to attack all sorts of civilian targets more or less with impunity, across a broad swathe of territory adjacent to the DRC’s North-eastern border with the CAR and South Sudan. Partly as a result of pressure brought to bear by Lightening Thunder (especially during the second half of 2009), the size of Kony’s force is today greatly reduced from its peak of around 3000 fighters, in 2005. Although exact figures are impossible to come by, the group probably now has no more than 400 cadres remaining. One recent UPDF estimate put the number even lower, at around 200 fighters, whilst the FARDC claim that the LRA is now down to just 30 men (however, both of these figures are almost certainly underestimates). Yet even with such a small number of fighters, the LRA remains a potent threat, organized as it now is into small mobile bands (some of which number just 5-10 people), which operate across a mostly forested area which is the size of France. </div>
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Indeed, history suggests that the LRA would pose an increased risk to civilians as they themselves come under greater pressure. Thus, during 2011, these mobile LRA bands carried out many dozens of small-scale attacks, most of them against civilian targets, resulting in at least 152 deaths, and 531 abductions. In one week alone, in early June, LRA cadres carried out no less than 22 separate attacks – most of them in Haut-Uele – including one (on 7th June) near Bangadi Town in which a woman was abducted from her fields, another (8th June) near Dungu in a which a 50-year old woman was killed, and a third (11th June) also near Dungu, in which 5 people died. All such incidents are now tracked in real time on <a href="http://www.lracrisistracker.com/">www.lracrisistracker.com</a>, a website that was set up by Invisible Children and another advocacy organization called Resolve, and which uses a network of radios that the two organizations have distributed across the LRA-affected regions (the network is mentioned briefly in KONY 2012). Moreover, at the present time Kony appears to be, if anything, <i>growing</i> in confidence, as for example evidenced by his recent decision to hold a ‘council-of-war’ for his senior commanders at his current base in the CAR. This was the first time that the LRA leadership has gathered in one place since the start of Lightening Thunder, and was no doubt called in response to the US deployment. In addition, there are growing indications that the LRA leader may be planning for his own ‘offensive’ – along the lines of the wave of attacks that the LRA carried out around Christmas 2008 – in the months ahead. </div>
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In conclusion, KONY 2012 is a well meaning campaign video, whose central message is not as surprising as some commentators have suggested. Nevertheless, there is a great danger inherent in its thesis; if viewers do indeed advocate for increased military action, yet that military action turns out to be inadequate, it may result in <i>worse</i> LRA predations against civilian populations in the Congolese-CAR borderlands.</div>
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Invisible Children's film constantly implores its viewers that 'we are all in this together' (or words to that effect). What we are actually all in together is a politically complicated world.</div>
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Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-78804969797554295862011-11-24T13:49:00.001-08:002012-08-07T17:58:34.171-07:00Qadhafi and UgandaIn the five weeks since Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qadhafi was killed by the National Liberation Army in his home town of Sirte, both scholars and media commentators have examined the legacy of his 42-year long reign. Across the many acres of print that have resulted, a key theme which has emerged has been the complex nature of the Colonel's foreign policy, especially in Africa. And nowhere, it would seem, are these complexities more obvious than in the history of Qadhafi's engagements with Uganda. Indeed, this helps to explain why the Libyan leader's recent demise has been greeted with such mixed reactions both from the Ugandan government, and from the Uganda public.<br />
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Thus, on the one hand, there are those mostly older Ugandans, especially those from the Central and Western regions, who still keenly recall the significant military support that Qadhafi provided to the Idi Amin regime during the 1970s. Following Amin's rise to power in 1971, Qadhafi quickly recognized that as a fellow Islamic regime - and moreover, as one that was explicitly anti-Israeli in orientation - Amin's Uganda would not only be a useful ally, but might even as a 'bridgehead' for the expansion of Libyan influence throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. It was for this reason that less than 12 months after Amin came to power, the Libyan leader sent 400 soldiers to bolster the Ugandan Army, and why he later replaced the 11 military jets that were destroyed by the Israelis during the famous Entebbe raid of 1976.<br />
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However, it was following Tanzania's invasion of Uganda in January 1979 that Qadhafi played his most decisive role in Uganda. With the Amin's army on the brink of collapse, in mid-February, the Libyan leader airlifted a major force of 2500 troops (consisting of regular soldiers, as well as members of Libya's People's Militia and its Islamic Pan-African Legion), along with tanks, armoured-personnel carriers (APCs), multiple-rocket launchers, artillery, and even a number of warplanes. The Libyan force finally met the Tanzanian advance at Lukuya swamp (about 70 miles southwest of Kampala, on the main Kampala-Masaka road) and a major engagement ensued. Even today, a number of burned-out vehicles from the battle are still easily visible from the Kampala-Masaka road. <br />
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The Battle of Lukuya (as it became known) initially went very well for the Libyans, and on the morning of 10th March, they routed the Tanzanian 201st Brigade, and took Lukuya Town. However, they then failed to press home their advantage, by not continuing on to the major urban centre of Masaka. One of the key mistakes the Libyans made was to not send out any reconnaissance south of Lukuya - which would have revealed that at that time, practically no opposition stood between them and Masaka. In addition, the Libyans failed to build proper defensive positions in and around Lukuya. In consequence, the Tanzanians were able to regroup, and on the night of 11th-12th March, launch a major counter-offensive against the town. Using a pincer-movement of the 201st Brigade and the more elite 208th, the Tanzanians caught the Libyans by surprise, and cut them to pieces. In one rather macabre detail, one Ugandan exile who had fought alongside the Tanzanians at Lukuya later recounted to me that many of the Libyan militiamen were unluckily dressed in desert fatigues. In the bright moonlight, and against the background of Lukuya's dark papyrus swamp, this attire resulted in their being 'lit up like Christmas trees', and eventually turned the whole thing into (what the Ugandan exile described to me as) a 'duck shoot'. <br />
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Lukuya was the last major engagement between the Libyans and the Tanzanians, although there were some further skirmishes in and around Entebbe - and one amusing episode in which the Libyans tried to retaliate by bombing Arusha. On that occasion the Libyan pilot famously got lost, missed his target, and ended up blowing up a herd of antelope near the Ngorongoro Crater. Finally, on 11th April that year, the Libyans secured Amin safe passage out of Uganda, and he spent almost a year in Tripoli before finally settling in Saudi Arabia. But the point is that because of this extensive military support to the Amin regime, Qadhafi became an especially despised figure in those Western and Central regions that had seen the bulk of the fighting. In addition, he remained persona non grata in administrative circles throughout the years of Obote II.<br />
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However, following the rise to power of Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) in 1986, Qadhafi once again became an influential figure on the Ugandan political scene. Yet from the beginning, the Libyan leader's relationship with Museveni was much more complicated than it ever had been with Amin. This stemmed from the fact that although Qadhafi provided the NRM with significant funding, arms and training during the bush war, Museveni - who had, after all, fought alongside the Tanzanians in 1979, as a senior member of the then Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) - always remained deeply suspicious of the Colonel's motivations, and especially his plan to use Uganda as a 'bridgehead' for Libyan influence into the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (an aim that never really diminished, even after the fall of Amin). Moreover, the relationship between the two men became even more complicated still, following Qadhafi's turn away from Arab nationalism, and towards African integration, as his major foreign policy objective, from the late 1990s onwards.<br />
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Following Qadhafi's move towards African integration - which eventually resulted in his being elected chair of the African Union (AU) in 2009 (amidst talk of a Libyan-sponsored unified African currency, a future 'United States of Africa', and so on) - Museveni continued to do very well financially out of Libya. Thus, it is widely rumoured that Qadhafi donated US$4 million to Museveni's 2000 referendum, and a further US$5 million towards his 2001 election campaign. Either way, the period since the 1999 has certainly seen Libyan companies invest US$375 million in Uganda. For example, Libya now owns a 60% stake in Tristar (which exports textiles from Uganda to the US), a 49% share of the National Housing and Construction Corporation (Uganda's largest real-estate developer), and a number of Uganda's largest hotels, including the iconic Lake Victoria Hotel in Entebbe. In addition, prior to Qadhafi's downfall, it was widely anticipated that Libya would also invest heavily in Uganda's nascent oil infrastructure, especially in the proposed US$300 million pipeline from Kampala to Mombasa. Yet against all this, over this same period Qadhafi also became increasingly suspicious of Museveni's deepening ties with Britain, Israel and (especially) the US, whilst for his part, the Ugandan president saw the Qadhafi's integrationist project as a threat to his own plans for a more integrated East African Community (EAC, which - according to current rumours - he one day hopes to lead).<br />
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<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-OtC6pfsmO5M/TtsJHZfBfUI/AAAAAAAAAEA/q3qLYpwW3iA/s1600/IMG_5640.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-OtC6pfsmO5M/TtsJHZfBfUI/AAAAAAAAAEA/q3qLYpwW3iA/s320/IMG_5640.jpg" width="212" /></a>In addition, it is my surmise that Museveni was also deeply suspicious of the popular effect that the Libyan leader's vision had upon the Ugandan public. Whilst much has been written both about the history of, and the reasoning behind, Qadhafi's drive towards an integrated Africa, existing commentary has (to my mind, at least) failed to capture the sheer pizzazz of the Colonel's enterprise, or the at times electrifying effect that it had upon ordinary Africans. And nowhere was this more obvious than in Kampala. Thus, I remember being in the city during Qadhafi's visit in 2001, on which occasion he behaved with such panache - in addition to his convoy of Mercedes-Benz, and his striking female bodyguards, on his first day in town the Libyan leader bought the entire stock of a local jewellers, and then proceeded to toss all of the jewellry, along with a load of cash, into the waiting crowds - that it couldn't fail but to galvanize public opinion. In these and other ways, he seemed to embody the very best of 'Afro-optimism', something that is deeply seductive in many African contexts. Thus, for months after his visit, images of Qadhafi remained a best seller for Ugandan photograph dealers, as people came to regard these as a 'must have' item in their personal photograph albums. Indeed, for a period, at least, Qadhafi may have even achieved greater popularity in Uganda than that enjoyed by Museveni himself. Moreover, the Libyan leader later erected a grand symbol of his authority in the Ugandan capital, in the form of the magnificent Qadhafi National Mosque which, sitting atop Old Kampala Hill, now dominates the city's skyline, especially at night (see my recent - albeit not very good quality - view from Kampala Road). Qadhafi took up the project in 2003, reviving an older plan for a 'grand mosque' in the city which had first been floated by Amin in the early 70s. <br />
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For these reasons, the relationship between Qadhafi and the current Ugandan president was always somewhat ambiguous, and this continued up until the end. Thus, following the start of the NATO bombing of Libya, in March 2011, Museveni embarked on a major round of 'shuttle-diplomacy' across Africa, in an attempt to secure an AU resolution against the airstrikes (an extraordinary meeting of the AU held in late May in Addis Ababa later called for an immediate cessation of the attacks). Yet at the very same time, we now know (thanks to the wikileaks cables) Museveni was privately concerned that the Libyan leader might even try to assassinate him, as a result of which he applied to the Americans for additional air radar information on his flights over international airspace. Finally, following the beginning of the NATO campaign, Museveni published a long (and somewhat rambling) treatise on Qadhafi in the journal Foreign Policy, in which he developed 11 reasons why NATO should desist, alongside 5 'positive points' about the Colonel, yet in which he notably also went on to expand 4 reasons why Qadhafi was 'no saint'. Moreover, it would appear that it was not only Museveni who picked up on the complexities of Qadhafi's approach to Uganda. Thus, I leave the final word here to Godfrey Ahabwe, former MP for Rubanda East, who finishes his own recent eulogy to Qadhafi in the Independent with the words:<br />
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"Fare thee well, the Great Leader of Libya and Africa, certain weaknesses notwithstanding."Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-678988100655805632011-11-02T16:03:00.000-07:002012-08-07T17:58:44.812-07:00More problems with oil<div>
In mid-September, shadow attorney general Abdul Katuntu, and government MP Theodore Ssekikubo, announced that they had gathered enough support for a petition on oil tax payments to force a special sitting of parliament (in the end, they gathered the names of at least 166 sitting MPs, significantly more than the 125 that are required to force an emergency debate. The signatories included a large number of members from the ruling National Resistance Movement, NRM). The MPs’ petition related to an ongoing dispute between the Ugandan government and Canadian oil firm Heritage Oil, over the latter’s sale of its exploration rights in the Lake Albert basin to UK-based Tullow Oil in July 2010 (Heritage is claiming back the US$405 million that was paid in capital gains tax on the US$1.5 billion deal). After several months of legal wrangling in Uganda itself, in late August, the government agreed that the case be shifted to an arbitration tribunal in London. However, MPs remained unhappy that important details of the dispute – including key documents (not least Heritage’s original Production Sharing Agreements, PSAs), as well as the government’s reasons for agreeing to take the case to London – remained classified. They are therefore attempting to now use parliamentary privilege to force further disclosures. </div>
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Then, in early October, another government MP, Gerald Karuhanga (MP for Youth, Western Uganda), tabled documents which purported to show that Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa had received a £16.5 million bribe from Tullow Oil. The claim led to older allegations against Internal Affairs Minister Hilary Onek and Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi resurfacing in the press - allegations that they had received bribes from Tullow and ENI, respectively. Interestingly, the documents relating to both the Kutesa and the Onek allegations have long been proved to be fake (even before the former were tabled in parliament). As early as mid-2010, the Maltese Police had dismissed the documents relating to Onek as forgeries (they involved a Maltese bank account). And the evidence against Mbabazi is equally thin, being based only on one of the US Embassy cables that were released by Wikileaks. Nevertheless, the allegations have had a major political impact. Just two days after Karuhanga's portfolio was presented to parliament, Kutesa resigned, and in the subsequent debate over the documents, Onek announced that he too would be stepping down - although it is not clear whether or not he has actually done so. (Kutesa's resignation also coincided with the start of his court case concerning another set of bribery allegations, related to the CHOGM meeting of 2007). Following Karuhanga's disclosures, Mbabazi has also come under increasing pressure - with growing calls for him to resign as well - although he has so far managed to remain aloof. </div>
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The current anger over the Heritage dispute, and the corruption allegations, reflects wider concerns amongst legislators over the way in which President Museveni and his inner-circle have handled oil issues, and the secrecy with which they have surrounded these dealings, from the time of Heritage and Tullow’s initial explorations in the Lake Albert basin, in 2007, onwards. In particular, recent months has also seen growing criticism of Museveni’s decision of early-2010 to place all of the western oil fields under the control of the Special Forces group, which is commanded by his son Lt. Col. Kainerugaba Muhoozi. Ostensibly done for reasons of security – following an earlier series of cross-border skirmishes between the Ugandan Army (UPDF) and their Congolese counterparts (the FARDC) – many now argue that the Special Forces’ deployment is in fact being used to control all access to the oil fields, and also to surrounding areas and populations. Thus, for example, the Special Forces group is also now policing the special permits which, issued by the executive, are required for anyone wishing to interview local authorities in the oil districts, to conduct research amongst local farmers and herders, and/or to take photographs in the region. (In addition, throughout 2011, a growing number of MPs, NGOs and journalists have found the permits themselves increasingly difficult to secure).<br />
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Opposition MPs, along with various Ugandan academics, NGOs, and the Ugandan Civil Society Coalition on Oil (CSCO), have also voiced growing concerns over the new legislative framework that the president and his senior ministers have begun to develop around the oil finds. In February 2008, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (MEMD) published a National Oil and Gas Policy (NOGP), which paved the way for new legislation related to revenue management and administration, revenue management, and environmental management. However, when Museveni released advanced copies of the first of these bills – the Petroleum (Exploration, Development, Production and Value Addition) Bill – in May 2010, it came in for immediate criticism. In particular, the draft legislation was once again seen as too secretive (for example, if passed, the new law would not even require mining companies to declare quantities of oil being extracted), but also as granting the Energy Minister too much power (amongst other things, he would have full discretion over all licencing issues), yet without providing adequate provision for an independent Petroleum Authority. In response, Museveni quietly dropped the bill in the run-up to the February elections. However, cross-party legislators are now gearing-up for further battles, following Energy Minister Irene Muloni's recent claim that she plans to have all three of new laws passed by the year's end. It is in this context, then, that a British-based NGO, International Alert, has recently published an overview of existing oil and gas laws in Uganda, as a guide for MPs in their upcoming debates over future oil legislation.<br />
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Moreover, it is not only at the national level that Museveni faces growing pressure over his handling of oil issues. In addition, in recent months local bodies such as the Kingdom of Bunyoro have also become increasingly vociferous in their complaints against the president (the majority of the newly-discovered reserves lie within the Bunyoro region). Bunyoro’s current grievances trace to the 2008 NOGP, which requires that 20% of all state oil revenues be returned to the region the oil came from, yet which effectively bars the Kingdom itself from receiving any of these monies (given that the institution is a purely ‘cultural’ organization). However, during 2011, this antagonism has been further exacerbated by a series of land disputes, including one in January during which a group of pastoralists known as the Balaalo were evicted from lands adjacent to the oil fields in Buliisa District. It has also occurred in a context in which Banyoro have become increasingly emboldened in their dealings with the central government, not least as a result of a growing ‘cultural pride’ that has been generated by a project to create a new US$1.5 million cultural centre in Hoima Town (the project is itself being partly funded by Tullow Oil). As a result, recent months have seen a growing number of localized protests against the police and the oil companies, including one in late August during which villagers in Buliisa blocked a road between the Kigogole oil well and Tullow’s nearby workers’ camp (the protest resulted in 10 arrests). In early September, Kingdom officials announced that they were joining up with regional MPs (of the Bunyoro Parliamentary Caucus) to lobby for a greater share of future oil revenues. Amongst the various initiatives already announced by the partnership are a planned land committee, to investigate disputes such as that involving the Balaalo, and a development group which will lobby for projects such as the proposed tarmacking of the Kihumba-Hoima-Kyenjojo road, and the mooted upgrades of several regional hospitals.<br />
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Nevertheless, the president himself may yet come to regard all of these developments as but minor inconveniences, given the enormous political capital that he stands to gain from forthcoming oil revenues. In April, Tullow Oil paid into the Bank of Uganda US$313 million, against the outstanding tax bill from the Heritage purchase. This payment is also now a source of legal action, again in London, with Tullow claiming that the money was actually part of Heritage's tax liability (they are now trying to recover it from the Canadian firm). Nevertheless, the payment removes the final hurdle in Uganda for Tullow’s proposed US$2.9 billion farm-out deal with France’s Total and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and as a result, that deal should now be completed soon (indeed, it was cleared by the Ugandan regulators on 12th September). As a result production may begin as early as mid-2012. Whilst it is difficult to separate out fact from rumour in the current talk over oil, it is highly likely that at least some of the president’s inner-circle will make vast personal fortunes once production starts. More importantly, though, once oil exports begin, Uganda will be much better placed to service its huge foreign debts, and to bolster its meagre foreign currency holdings (which have dwindled in recent months, not least as a result of the Museveni’s decision to purchase US$740 million-worth of Russian fighter jets). Once production starts, oil is expected to generate US$2 billion a year; the current national budget is US$3 billion pa. These factors will in turn greatly improve Uganda’s trade volumes, especially with its partners in the East African Community (EAC). Moreover, given how astute Museveni has always been at turning any economic success into political gain – and given that he has recently faced popular protests over rising food and fuel prices – it is almost inconceivable that the president will not turn all of this to his significant advantage with the electorate. </div>
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These same developments are also likely to have positive effects upon Uganda’s foreign relations, and especially upon its relations with other EAC states. These relations will be further improved by Uganda’s recent decision to build a US$2 billion public-private oil refinery near Hoima, which when complete, will have a capacity to refine 150,000 barrels per day (bpd). Given that Uganda’s domestic market currently uses only about 12,000 bpd, it is highly likely that the refinery will soon be flooding regional markets with cheap petrol. Indeed, it is with this in mind that in April, the MEMD applied to parliament for a US$13.5 million loan to buy land for an extension of Kenya’s existing Mombasa-Eldoret pipeline into Kampala. The idea of extending the pipeline was first been mooted in the mid-2000s, as a means for more easily importing petrol into Uganda. However, in the current context the plan has gained even greater urgency, as a potential infrastructure for exporting petrol as well (the updated plan almost triples the original estimate for the project, not least because it now includes a reverse flow on the pipeline). In addition, the EAC recently secured a US$600,000 grant from the African Development Bank to conduct a feasibility study on developing the pipeline into a pan-regional facility, which when complete, could extend as far as Kigali and Bujumbura. Finally, Nairobi is also hoping to gain from additional Ugandan crude oil that may be transported across its territory. With current estimates suggesting that the Lake Albert oil fields may eventually produce up to 350,000 bpd, it is clear that even when it is fully operational, the Hoima refinery will be able to process only part of Uganda’s output. The remainder, then, will have to be transported to the coast for shipping via Kenya.<br />
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However, in the meantime, Museveni will continue to face opposition from MPs over his handling of oil, and especially from the 'young turks' within his own parliamentary party. Whilst these challenges are unlikely to become significant enough to ultimately threaten his position as president, they are likely to become a growing 'thorn in his side'. Museveni has already suffered some significant setbacks at the hands of the new (9th) parliament, and he may well have to make further concessions (including some major concessions?) before it is completed. However, his own personal standing with the electorate is unlikely to be significantly effected by these wrangles. In the meantime, local disputes in Bunyoro - especially those involving land - will rumble on, and may well intensify in the months and years ahead. Moreover, whilst these issues remain relatively localized at present, they could potentially escalate further, especially if they were to take on an ethnic-hue - for example, by becoming articulated as difficulties between the region's ethnic Banyoro, and Bakiga, populations - or more significantly, if a foreign power were to meddle in the region's affairs. </div>
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Whatever happens, it is unlikely that Uganda's problems with oil are over yet.</div>Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-9433342832688804212011-10-02T20:38:00.000-07:002012-05-24T15:53:00.683-07:00Museveni faces growing difficultiesIt is now almost 5 months since President Yoweri Museveni’s was sworn in for his latest five-year term of office, which when complete, will extend his rule to 30 years. However, the ‘political barometer’ has registered a significant drop both in the president’s political fortunes since the February polls (which he won with 68% of the vote). The reason for this relates to the storm of problems that Museveni has faced over recent months, as he struggles to control a major economic crisis, against the backdrop of growing discontent within his own party (the National Resistance Movement, NRM), and an emboldened domestic opposition. <br />
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The biggest difficulties that Museveni faces at this time relate to the economy. Since late 2010, rising food and fuel prices, combined with extravagant government spending in the run-up to the February polls, have steadily pushed up inflation. Annual inflation reached 21.4% in August. In protest, several large commodity suppliers in Central Kampala (and other urban centres) temporarily suspended trading, in an action that appears to have had widespread popular support. The Ugandan shilling - along with with other East African currencies - has also been under huge press for much of 2011. Following several dips early in the year, on 26th August, the currency slumped to an all-time low against the greenback, at 2825:1. The Bank of Uganda (BoU) was eventually forced to intervene. This trend is primarily driven by falling exports. However, in June, it was exacerbated by an article published in the Financial Times of London, in which the normally highly diplomatic, and deeply loyal, BoU Governor Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile openly criticized Museveni’s economic policies. In particular, the governor attacked the president’s earlier decision to purchase six Russian-made Sukhoi-Knaapo military jets using US$740 million of Uganda’s foreign currency reserves. According to Tumusiime-Mutebile the purchase, which was made without parliamentary approval, leaves the country dangerously exposed in the event of future global shocks.<br />
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Since the February elections, the president’s difficulties have been further compounded by growing dissent from within his parliamentary party. For several years now, a growing body of younger NRM MPs have become increasingly distrustful of Museveni and the party executive, and have sought both to pursue an independent legislative agenda, and to block the president on certain key votes. For example, it was a group of these ‘young turks’ – most of whom are in their 30s or early-40s, and are therefore 3 political generations removed from the ‘NRM historicals’ – who introduced the notorious Anti-homosexuality Bill in 2009, and who then kept the bill alive even after Museveni had issued an executive order against it. In addition, the same actors were also behind a parliamentary rebellion against the president’s Cultural Leaders’ Bill in December 2010. In the end, that challenge was seen off only after Museveni gave each of the rebel MPs a personal UgSh20 million grant to monitor National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) projects in their constituencies (grants which have since been decried by the opposition as ‘bribes’). <br />
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However, during the current sitting of parliament, the ‘young turks’ have become even more emboldened still, not least given that their number grew at the February general election. In other words, that election saw a record number of younger NRM MPs being elected to parliament, many of whom feel no particular loyalty towards the president, nor have any direct ties to him. Thus, the beginning of this 9th parliament has already seen rebel MPs:<br />
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<li>Rejecting four of Museveni’s proposed ministerial appointments, on the grounds that the candidates had either ‘questionable morals’, or inadequate academic qualifications. </li>
<li>Building a consensus against the president’s draft Anti-Bail legislation (which if passed, would remove the right to bail for certain crimes, including that of ‘economic sabotage’ – a charge that Museveni has previously leveled against his main political challenger, leader of the opposition, Kizza Besigye).</li>
<li>Voting down Museveni’s favoured candidate for the chairpersonship of the influential Uganda Women’s Parliamentary Association, UWOPA (in the end an opposition MP, Betty Amongi, was elected to the position).</li>
<li>Coming out against the president’s plan to revive the sale of part of Mabira Forest outside Kampala to the Sugar Corporation of Uganda (the sale would raise an estimated UgSh 11.5 billion. However, such is the strength of public opinion against the sale, that a previous attempt to do so in 2007, resulted in rioting across the capital).</li>
<li>Blocking an attempt by Energy Minister Irene Muloni to raise a $50 million loan for outstanding subsidies owed to electricity distributor UMEME (who in early July had pulled the plug on the national grid, temporarily plunging the entire country into darkness).</li>
<li>Refusing to endorse the budgets of a number of Ministries, including those of Defence and Foreign Affairs.</li>
<li>Rejecting a government proposal to increase teachers’ salaries by up to 44%.</li>
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In response, in mid-July, Museveni began inviting groups of NRM MPs to a series of ‘agricultural modernization tours’ at his home in South-western Uganda, during which he again offered to facilitate each to create a model agricultural project in his/her home constituencies. However, there is a growing danger that if these sorts of tactics don’t work, and the current trends within the parliamentary caucus continue, that Museveni may soon become seen as a ‘lame duck’ president – something that would almost certainly trigger an internal challenge for his position. Indeed, the president now seems to be guarding against just such a possibility, for example, in his recent sacking of NRM heavyweight Gilbert Bukenya as vice-president; he had been widely tipped to one day challenge Museveni for the party leadership. Bukenya saw Anti-Corruption Court proceedings against his restarted in June, on charges related to alleged embezzlement during the 2007 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Kampala. <br />
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However, other potential challengers within the NRM cannot be so easily removed. In particular, the career of Bukenya’s main rival, Amama Mbabazi, continues to go from strength-to-strength. Following his successful coordination of Museveni’s recent re-election campaign, in June Mbabazi was rewarded by being made the new Prime Minister. Although Museveni stipulated that Mbabazi give up the position of NRM secretary-general in order to assume the premiership, Mbabazi has simply refused to do so. As a result, he now holds the two most senior offices of the party – below those held by Museveni – leaving him very well positioned to eventually challenge for the presidency. Should a genuine leadership challenge develop, then Museveni would likely rely on his power base within the army, the upper-echelons of which remain loyal. </div>
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Against this background of deepening economic crisis, and internal strife within the NRM, on 16th July, opposition leader Kizza Besigye announced his intention to restart the ‘Walk to Work’ (W2W) campaign:</div>
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Previous actions within this campaign had in April and May led to some of the worst civil unrest in Uganda for 25 years, and – amidst accusations of heavy-handed tactics by the police – left at least 5 people dead, and more than 130 hospitalized. During the fifth W2W action, on 28th April, Besigye himself had been badly injured, and was subsequently taken to Nairobi for treatment. Upon his return from Kenya he was placed under house arrest, although all charges against him were eventually dropped. </div>
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However, whether a second round of W2W protests will ultimately prove more successful than the first – and might thereby turn popular discontent over the economy, and youthful anger against the authorities, into a genuine swing away from the ruling party – seems highly doubtful, not least given how divided the opposition currently are. On 5th July Besigye announced his decision to step down as party leader of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) when his current term ends (in 2014), in a move apparently designed to ward off a leadership challenge before that time. However, the move may have been counter productive, in that it makes it increasingly unlikely that other opposition parties – especially the influential Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) and the Democratic Party (DP) – will ever unite behind future Besigye-led protests. Indeed, at around the same time that Besigye was making his leadership announcement, the UPC and the DP – along with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) – were busy creating an opposition platform of their own. Called ‘Free Uganda Now’, this platform has since attempted to mount a number of protest events of its own (although to date, most of these have been thwarted by the authorities). But as a result, at present, it is not clear whether the UPC and DP – both of whom were active participants in the first round of W2W – will even take part in future actions organized under this banned. Yet if the opposition cannot even agree upon a common platform for protest, then genuine, and sustained, political gains seem unattainable. </div>
</div>Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-13923144901538912642011-09-26T19:44:00.000-07:002011-11-03T00:43:32.000-07:00South Sudan in the RegionUganda, Kenya and Ethiopia all stand to benefit greatly from the recent independence of South Sudan. All three countries had a long history of engagement with the 2nd Sudanese Civil War, and with the 6-year political settlement that followed the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. As a result, all three governments are now seeking to strengthen their diplomatic and commercial ties with Juba, in moves that will doubtless improve the security situation both within the new new country itself, and in bordering areas. These deepening ties will probably also result in the South Sudan being quickly incorporated into the EAC, which will in turn make Juba less reliant upon its current economic lifeline of oil exports through Sudan.<br />
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It is probably no coincidence that the largest national delegations to attend the 9th July independence celebrations in Juba were those led by Presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Mwai Kibaki of Kenya, and Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. All three are long standing allies of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) – which forms the basis of the new Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) – and as such, all were deeply involved both in the civil war, and in the peace process that finally ended it. Moreover, all three now regard the establishment of a strong state in Juba as crucial both to their own security interests, and for the general stability of the East African region as whole:<br />
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<b>Uganda:</b> Uganda was a key ally of the SPLM/A throughout the war, and provided major military and logistical support through the fighting. From the mid-1980s onwards, Kampala was also the hub for the SPLM/A diplomatic efforts abroad, and Uganda was also involved in the Machakos talks (in its capacity as a member of the IGAD sub-committee on Sudan). There is strong evidence that in recent months, Kampala has also been providing ongoing military assistance to the nascent GoSS. By engaging with Southern Sudan in these ways, President Museveni’s primary motivation throughout has been to secure his northern regions from insurgencies such as that of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). In the present context, his hope is that a more stable government in Juba will mitigate against the LRA ever being able to re-establish their former bases in Southern Sudan (from which they were expelled during Operation Iron Fist, in 2002). In addition, he may also be hoping that South Sudan will continue to support ongoing multi-national military operations against current LRA positions (in North-eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic).<br />
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<b>Kenya:</b> Nairobi has also been a longstanding regional ally of the SPLA/M, having hosted the organization’s leadership and headquarters since 1991. From 2002 onwards, Kenya oversaw the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-supported peace talks which resulted in the signing of the CPA (the talks were held in Machakos and chaired by retired Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo). Immediately following the agreement, in February 2005, Kibaki set up the Kenya Southern Sudan Liaison Office (KESSULO), ostensibly to monitor the implementation of agreement, but also as a conduit for Kenyan support into Southern Sudan. In the run up to South Sudan’s independence, KESSULO provided both commercial and legal advice to the SPLA/M leadership, and also channelled several million dollars worth of aid into the region, especially for purposes of training a nascent GoSS civil service. In so doing, the Kenyan government are partly motivated by a desire to eventually repatriate the 25,000 Southern Sudanese refugees who remain in their country (although this number is greatly down from the 100,000 who were based in Kenya at the height of the Sudan civil war, their ongoing presence remains a point of political contention in Nairobi). In addition, though, the Kenyan government also hopes that a more stable and prosperous South Sudan might have similar, ‘knock on’ effects in their own Rift Valley Province (which partly borders the new state, and which was the scene of some of the worst violence following the contested Kenyan presidential elections of December 2007). This is particularly an aspiration of Prime Minister Raila Odinga, who hails from Rift Valley. <br />
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<b>Ethiopia:</b> Addis Ababa was a third crucial ally of the SPLM/A, especially during the early part of the war, when they provided bases, training, and equipment to the rebel group. Following the rise to power of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPDRF) in 1993, the SPLM/A were expelled to Kenya. However, relations soon improved, and Ethiopia later went on to also be a key partner in the IGAD talks. President Zenawi has also gone on to support the nascent GoSS both diplomatically and militarily, ever since. Once again, the main concern relates to security, and in particular, the potential effects of renewed major civil war in Southern Sudan. In recent years, Ethiopia’s main security concerns have primarily related to Eritrea (following the border war of 1998-2000) and Somalia (following their invasion of that country, in December 2007). However, the thinking in Addis now seems to be that a resumption of fighting in Southern Sudan could vastly complicate those other situations, by providing opportunities that both Asmara and the Somali Islamic Courts Union (ICU) might be able to exploit. In particular, Zenawi appears particularly concerned that a renewed Sudanese war would require large numbers of Ethiopian troops to be redeployed along the country’s western border. <br />
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However, it is also worth pointing out that although Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia have been strongly in favour of the creation of an independent South Sudan (given the factors described above), other nearby states have been less impressed by the development. In particular, elements in Mogadishu who oppose the recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state have been downright alarmed by the African Union’s (AU) complicity in a move which overturns a long established legal principle on the continent that colonial borders should never be redrawn (because of the problems that this would create). Similarly, Kinshasa may now also have cause for concern, especially if the creation of South Sudan were to reignite discussion over the sovereign status of, for example, the Kivus or – more importantly – Katanga. <br />
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Yet it is worth pointing out that in addition to these geo-political considerations, several East Africa government are also now eyeing-up the economic potential of an independent South Sudan. In the period leading up to independence, economic ties had already deepened significantly, as for example, in the fact that between 2006-2008, Ugandan exports into South Sudan grew by 300%, to US$250 million pa (making it Uganda’s largest export market. With little manufacturing industry of its own, South Sudan is likely to remain dependent on imports for some time to come). In addition, hundreds of Kenyan entrepreneurs began to set up operations in Juba, and other Southern Sudanese urban centres. And the next few years will likely see these ties expand much further still. In particular, trade with all East African countries will be hugely boosted by South Sudan’s eventual entry into the East African Community (EAC). In April, outgoing EAC Secretary General Juma Mwapachu described South Sudan’s entry into the bloc as a question of ‘not if, but when’.<br />
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For one thing, the accession of South Sudan into the EAC would make it much easier to integrate the country into regional transport plans, which are widely expected to boost economic growth throughout the bloc over the next two decades. Indeed, the Kenyan government already regards South Sudan as a critical element of their plan to build a new deep water port at the Lamu archipelago (one capable of taking ships bigger than those that can be currently accommodated at Mombasa). Given the location of the Lamu project, close to Kenya’s northern border with Somalia, it is already anticipated that goods moving into and out of South Sudan will account for a significant proportion of the port’s overall cargo flows. In addition, plans are also afoot to incorporate South Sudan into the UN Economic Commission for Africa’s (UNECA) and Africa Development Bank’s (ADB) Trans-African Highway Network (THAN), through the construction of a feeder highway into Juba (either from Kampala or, more likely, from Northern Kenya). When completed, the THAN aims to establish a network of continuously-metalled roads that transect the entire continent from North to South, and East to West, and which will act as international trade corridors. Finally, South Sudan’s entry into the bloc will also bring it into the EAC’s plans to develop a new regional rail infrastructure. The EAC Secretariat recently announced that they plan to invest US$25 billion in road and rail over the next 10 years (although it is not yet clear how this will be financed, or whether it will be enough to pay for the current designs). <br />
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However, potentially the most significant economic implication of South Sudan’s independence relates to oil extraction. At present, South Sudan sits on an estimated 80% of all of the former (united) Sudan’s oil reserves. Yet at present, this can only be exported northwards, either through a pipeline which runs to Port Sudan, or to refineries in the north, and as a result, the new nation remains entirely dependent on the north for its major revenue stream (and vice-versa). Moreover, Juba has to date failed to agree a mechanism with Khartoum as to how the revenues from this ‘division of labour’ will eventually be divided. In this context, then, both Uganda and Kenya, in particular, are pressing for advantage, Uganda through a plan to expand its proposed refinery at Hoima, in Western Uganda, to allow it to process some of South Sudan’s oil as well (construction of the refinery is due to begin next year), Kenya through a proposal to build a new 1400 km pipeline from Juba to its planned Lamu facility. Both plans are currently attracting widespread international investment interest.<br />
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Finally, the creation of Southern Sudan will almost certainly also affect current international debates over management of the Nile River, which have so far seen disputes between Egypt and Uganda and Ethiopia (the latter two of which plan to build major hydroelectric facilities on the White and Blue Niles, respectively). However, it is not yet clear how the government in Juba will position itself vis-à-vis these disputes (or the wider issue of Nile management in general).<br />
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In recent months, much of the commentary on South Sudan's independence has focused on the new state's relationship with its more powerful northern neighbour. Certainly, Juba's diplomatic agenda will continue to be dominated by its relationship with Khartoum for some time to come. Nevertheless, it is as well to remember that the genesis of South Sudan also has highly significant regional implications.Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-50067056989348420372011-09-12T21:20:00.000-07:002011-11-03T00:42:49.900-07:00The Anti-Homosexuality Bill, 2009It is now almost two years since a group of young Ugandan MPs within the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) tabled the notorious private members bill, the Anti-Homosexuality Bill. The bill proposed increased sentences for all forms of homosexuality, and the death penalty for any act of 'aggravated homosexuality' (defined in terms of 'serial offending', sex with a minor, sex with a person with disabilities, or sex for an HIV+ individual).<br />
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Led by David Bahati, MP for Ndorwa West, this reactionary political gesture challenged the public views of their party's leader, President Museveni, and his government's avowed commitment to social equity. As a result, the bill was immediately disowned by several senior ministers. However, Bahati and his conspirators used skillful PR and a sympathetic media to build popular support for the draft legislation. Their rabble-rousing may also have been tolerated because it served to distract public attention from growing social and political unrest.<br />
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In late 2009, the President attempted to squash the proposal by issuing an executive order against it, in which he claimed that the legislation had become a ‘foreign policy issue’ (given the widespread condemnation that it was by then receiving from donors, and from the international human rights community). He also appointed a special parliamentary committee that found '99 per cent' of the draft legislation to be either 'unconstitutional' or 'redundant'.</div>
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However, despite these, and other, legal rulings against it, the bill continued its passage through parliament, bolstered by the homophobic content of some popular radio stations, and print media outlets. One key forum for this sentiment became the radio ‘phone- in’ show, in which callers would typically take it in turns to berate either an individual gay man, or gay people in general. The print media – especially the tabloid press – also dedicated a growing number of articles to the subject. This toxic media environment reached its zenith in October 2010, when a tabloid newspaper called Rolling Stone published the photographs, names, and addresses, of 100 allegedly gay indviduals – including one Anglican Bishop – alongside a banned headline that read: ‘Hang Them’. </div>
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For a thoughtful examination of this poisonous media environment, and its implications for Uganda's LGBT community, see BBC Radio 1 DJ Scott Mill's documentary on the subject, which was first broadcast in February 2011. The first part of Mill's film can be viewed here:<br />
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But encouraged by this media response to his plan, and by the support that he was receiving from certain sections of the Pentecostal-charismatic (P/c) Christian community, in early 2011, Bahati and the others attempted to revive their bill. With dissent growing around Museveni’s twenty-five year incumbency, the timing seemed right. Whether by cynical manipulation or unhappy political coincidence, the timing was in fact potent. In January 2011, just weeks before Museveni’s seventh election win, a prominent gay-rights activist called David Kato – who was one of those named in the Rolling Stone list – was brutally murdered at his home in Kampala. In one particularly shocking aspect of the case, fighting then broke at Kato’s funeral, when the presiding pastor delivered an anti-gay sermon. </div>
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This time the international furore reached heightened proportions, and led in May this year to a major campaign putting pressure on the Ugandan parliament. As a result, the Anti-Homosexuality Bill’s passage was again blocked (this time on a technicality). However, reflecting just how emboldened the NRM's 'young turks' have become within the current (9th) parliament, it seems likely that Bahati and the others will again attempt to revive the draft legislation. Either way, the wider homophobia remains.</div>
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Earlier this year, Dr. David Mills and I were approached by members of <i>All Our Children</i>, an education charity with which we are involved, to comment on the current situation regarding both the bill and wider homophobia in Uganda, and to think through its implications for individuals and agencies who are working in the country. Our discussions on the subject eventually led to us drafting a 'briefing paper', and this has now been published on <i>All Our Children's</i> website. In this paper we look at the background to the current bill, and also at some of the wider historical, political and cultural dimensions to homophobia in Uganda. We hope that the paper - which can be downloaded <a href="http://allourchildren.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Uganda-anti-gay-briefingJuly2011.pdf">here</a> - will be of interest and use for a wide range of actors currently engaged in the country.</div>
</div>Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-41479106136693714652011-05-04T17:21:00.001-07:002012-05-24T15:53:00.666-07:00The 'Walk to Work' campaignPeople across Kampala, and other urban centres, are today bracing themselves for the sixth day of the 'Walk to Work' campaign (W2W). This campaign has already resulted in the worst civil disturbances in Uganda since the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power, in 1986. However, contrary to what some commentators are now suggesting, these protests are unlikely to develop into an 'Egyptian style' uprising. <br />
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">Rather, </span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">W2W needs to be seen as a consequence of the recently concluded presidential and parliamentary elections. Following their disastrous showing in those polls, in early April, the Uganda opposition launched an organization for direct action, called the 'Activists for Change' (A4C). </span>President Museveni's main opponent Kizza Besigye (who polled just 26% in February) and his Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) played a key role in its formation. MP-elect Mathias Mpuuga, a senior member of the Democratic Party (DP) and well-known Buganda-nationalist, fronts the organization, while two other presidential contenders - DP leader Norbert Mao and Uganda People's Congress (UPC) leader Olara Otunnu - are also highly visible. It is also supported by other opposition groups, and by a number of civil society organizations (including senior figures within the Church of Uganda).</div>
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On 11th April, A4C launched the W2W campaign, which was designed to harness popular discontent over rising food and fuel prices. Inflation had weakened to single digit figures following the global downturn, after averaging 12.5% during 2008-9, but has climbed steadily in the past six months - driven by rising food and fuel prices, and a weakening Ugandan shilling. In addition, government spending rose ahead of the polls - in line with January's supplementary budget of UgSh 600 billion - exacerbating these pressures. Food production also dropped throughout early-2011, as a result of a prolonged drought caused by the La Nina weather system (incidentally, I have documented the profound social consequences of a previous La Nina in my book <i>Ghosts of Kanungu</i>, 2009). The combined result was that headline inflation hit double-digit figures in March and April, while the food price index increased by 39.3% in April. </div>
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However, from the beginning, the main story of W2W was the security forces' markedly draconian response to the protests. On the first day of the campaign, Besigye, Mao and several dozen opposition MPs were arrested. Mao's arrest resulted in violent protests, in which the police shot dead three people. Besigye was arrested again two days later, and shot in the arm with a rubber bullet. Besigye and Mao were also arrested during the third W2W event. On 21st April, the fourth day of W2W, the police responded to a protest in Mpuuga's home town of Masaka by firing live rounds, accidentally killing a baby. On 28th April, during the fifth W2W action, Besigye attempted to drive into Kampala city centre. However, the police stopped his convoy on several occasions, before finally halting it near Wandageya. During the ensuing standoff, plainclothes police stormed Besigye's vehicle, and subdued him with pepper spray. Tear gas canisters were also fired directly at some of his entourage. Besigye was dragged from the vehicle, and manhandled into a waiting police truck. Cameramen from Kampala's NTV recorded the entire incident, and their footage can be viewed here: </div>
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When these images were broadcast on NTV (and other stations), and were posted on the internet, they triggered riots in various locations around Kampala. The earliest incidents were reported from various central locations, including the densely populated areas around Kisekka Market, the Old Taxi Park and Lugogo Stadium. However, they soon spread to various outlying locations as well, including the areas around the FDC headquarters in Najjanankumbi, and various sites along the Entebbe road (the largest being at Kajjansi, which is about 20 km south of Kampala). Later, they also spread to Makerere University, as well as to various other urban centres around the country (including Masaka, Mbale and Mbarara). At each of these locations, scores of mostly young men set tires and cars alight, and fought running battles with police and the army. The security forces fired tear gas and live ammunition into the crowds. At least 5 people were killed (all of them in and around Kampala), at least 139 were hospitalized (at least 20 of them with gunshot wounds), and more than 700 were arrested. Some sources have put the death toll as high as 9.</div>
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Both the opposition and media commentators have been quick to paint the events as a spontaneous outbreak of popular unrest directed against Museveni's government, similar to that which occurred in Egypt, and thus likely to gather momentum. However, the opposition's position here is overstated:</div>
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Firstly, there is no anti-regime consensus. Many Ugandans share the opposition's unease over food and fuel prices. However, there is no indication that most people directly blame the government for these. A recent televised address, in which Museveni cited external pressures for the economic strain, was sympathetically received among large sections of the population. And we must remember that Museveni was reelected with an overwhelming majority less than three months ago. Secondly, although there has been growing outrage at Besigye's treatment in recent weeks, it is unlikely that Friday's riots can be seen as an expression of popular support for him, or for his movement. All of the riots in Kamapala, in particular, occurred in and around long-established FDC strongholds - suggesting that they were orchestrated by existing FDC sympathizers (possibly even by the network of 'vigilante' groups with which the party has been associated in the past). Moreover, the fact that they all ended so quickly - even in Kisekka and Kajjansi, the scenes of the heaviest clashes, the rioting lasted no more than two hours - contrasts with the image of a 'popular uprising'. Finally, there is little indication that more people will become mobilized to the A4C cause as a result of Friday's riots. Certainly, FDC activists - especially the young men - are now expecting more violence, starting today. However, throughout 30th April and 1st May radio talk shows were also inundated with callers appealing for calm. For his part, Besigye himself - who following his arrest was flown to Nairobi for medical treatment - has subsequently made a similar request (albeit while also reiterating that peaceful protests would continue).</div>
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However, this is not to say that the government has emerged from all of this unscathed. On the contrary, Museveni and the security services have come in for growing criticism for their handling of events. The footage of Besigye's fourth arrest (above) - as well as a rather confused press conference in which Inspector General of Police Kale Kayihura criticized his own commanders for their actions before and during the riots - has fed negative perceptions. During Friday's events, the police entirely lost control of at least one of the riot sites (Kisekka), following which the Special Forces group - under the command of Museveni's son Kainerugaba Muhoozi - had to be called in (significantly escalating the violence at that location). Yesterday, Wednesday 4th May, hundreds of lawyers across the country began a three day strike to protest what they called the 'crimes against humanity' committed by the security services last Friday.</div>
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However, the biggest criticisms of the government's handling of events appears to be coming from the international community. In a snub to Museveni, Besigye was visited in prison by the Irish and Dutch ambassadors (on 11th April) and by the Norweigan and French ambassadors (on 18th April). And following the riots of 29th April, both the EU and the UN have publically criticized Museveni. The UN Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, called on the Ugandan government to halt its 'excessive' use of force on civilians. </div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Times;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">So where do we go from here? Certainly, more civil unrest is likely in the days to come. However, this is unlikely to turn into an Egyptian style uprising. More likely, a combination of domestic and international pressure will force Museveni into major concessions, possibly involving a large tax reduction on fuel (a move just made in neighbouring Kenya). Rumours now abound in Kampala that the international community may even now try to force Museveni into forming a 'unity government' with the opposition, as a means for diffusion tensions. However, this is unlikely to happen, given the leverage that Museveni has as the lead player in ongoing peace keeping operations in Somalia. In addition, even if the opposition were brought into such an arrangement, it is unlikely that they would be able to turn this into tangible gains. To achieve these, they would also need to have to develop a coherent agenda - something they have singularly failed to do for the past 5 years (indeed, the W2W campaign is probably the first thing that they <i>have </i>agreed on, in all that time). </span></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Times;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: Georgia, serif;">Still, in light the growing chorus of criticism of Museveni's handling of the protests, Besigye and his allies may already count the W2W campaign as a significant success. </span></span></div>Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-43968239928251805392011-04-17T16:47:00.000-07:002012-08-09T15:15:49.419-07:00Publication- Photography in early colonial Uganda, circa 1904-1928<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-iL8A-vkU50Y/Tat-nGQjLLI/AAAAAAAAAD4/-EgzWOx15uM/s1600/H%2Band%2BA%2BCover%2BImage.jpg"><img alt="" border="0" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5596706172097998002" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-iL8A-vkU50Y/Tat-nGQjLLI/AAAAAAAAAD4/-EgzWOx15uM/s400/H%2Band%2BA%2BCover%2BImage.jpg" style="cursor: hand; cursor: pointer; float: right; height: 400px; margin: 0 0 10px 10px; width: 277px;" /></a><br />
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We have recently published a special issue of the journal History and Anthropology, entitled <i>Routes and Traces: Anthropology, Photography and the Archive</i>. The collection is co-edited by myself and Marcus Banks, of the University of Oxford, and explores recent debates concerning the interpretation of historical ethnographic photographs.</div>
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The collection includes chapters on Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, West Africa and elsewhere. However, my own contribution explores the early history of the camera in Uganda, especially in the period around the staging of the famous Kampala Agricultural and Industrial Exhibition (which was held on the newly created show-grounds, below Mengo Hill, on 9th November 1908). Like other colonial expos of the time, the Kampala Exhibition was a key event in the early development of the colonial state in Uganda. </div>
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Many of the 'official' photographs that were taken in and around the Kampala Exhibition were produced by one photo studio, the Alfred Lobo Studio, which was opened in Entebbe in 1904, and which later moved to Kampala - where it remained until its closure circa 1939. Very little is known about Alfred Lobo himself, or about any of his studio's staff. The few biographical details we do have are <a href="http://www.lib.cam.ac.uk/rcs_photographers/entry.php?id=303">neatly summarized</a> in the Royal Commonwealth Society Photographers' Index, at the University of Cambridge Library. Nevertheless, my article argues that much can still be deduced from Lobo images about the contexts of photographic production, and circulation, in Uganda at this time.</div>
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Specifically, the article argues that many 'official' photographs of this period were taken in an attempt to represent the new Uganda colony as an inclusive, even collaborative, social project - one in which all of Uganda's ethnic groups, and all classes of its European colonists, had some part to play. However, these intentions were subsequently lost, as the photographs themselves were later circulated, and reproduced, in new ways. In particular, the article traces how several images from the Exhibition were later reprinted in a series of picture postcards, in ways which instead cast their African subjects in largely negative, and in some cases overtly racist, terms.</div>
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The contents of the special issue can be viewed <a href="http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=g929642426">here</a>, on the Taylor and Francis website. This contents page currently allows the introduction to be downloaded, and it also includes an audio-interview I recorded with journal editor Stephen Lyon, in New Orleans in November 2010. The interview discusses the evolution of this special issue, recent scholarship on African photography, and some current general issues in visual anthropology. </div>Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-45713145492210814082011-02-21T10:51:00.000-08:002011-11-03T00:40:51.907-07:00NO CHANGE!...<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-aklXumcXYfw/TWtU7uytYxI/AAAAAAAAAC4/2ndHFKSUoq8/s1600/582dcb5076a2b222db0bffdf0bd0-grande.jpg"><img alt="" border="0" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5578645948578226962" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-aklXumcXYfw/TWtU7uytYxI/AAAAAAAAAC4/2ndHFKSUoq8/s400/582dcb5076a2b222db0bffdf0bd0-grande.jpg" style="cursor: hand; cursor: pointer; float: right; height: 267px; margin: 0 0 10px 10px; width: 400px;" /></a><br />
...as they say in Uganda. <br />
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And so it has proved once again, with incumbent President Yoweri Museveni winning another 5 years in office, which will take his cumulative time in power to 30 years, by 2016. Whilst the fact that Museveni won the presidential election on 18th February came as a surprise to no one, the scale of his victory took even some veteran Uganda commentators by surprise. The final tally gave Museveni 68%, which is a return to his 2001 level of support, and a significant improvement on the 57% he received in 2006. His main challenger, Kizza Besigye, reversed gains made across the previous two elections by polling just 26%, whilst none of the other presidential candidates secured more than 2% each. <br />
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As I've argued before, the main story of these elections was one of opposition failure. Certainly, it did not help Besigye that throughout the campaigns, he was frequently harassed by the authorities, and effectively barred from many media outlets. Nevertheless, he also made key strategic errors, in particular in his choice of locations for campaigning, and in the tone of his rhetoric in some areas (for example, in the Southwest, his discourse centred around issues of ethnicity, even though this subject is of no great concern to most voters there). </div>
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However, again this, Museveni also ran a flawless campaign throughout, using both his own (extensive) personal charisma, and his control of the levers of state, to great effect. The first element was evident from the beginning, when he kicked off his bid for re-election by releasing a 'rap song' recorded by the fashionable Fenon Studios in Kampala. The song was played on radio stations throughout the country, and played particularly well with young urban voters - a constituency that had previously been a mainstay for the opposition - thus galvanizing Museveni's campaign from the off. </div>
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From there, though, Museveni also went on to 'repair' his relations with Baganda voters (who according to some commentators, are historically the most important voting bloc in the country). He achieved this by granting two key concessions. The first was to reopen the Buganda Kingdom's FM radio station, which had been closed since the Baganda-nationalist riots of September 2009. The second was to heavily amend several contested clauses within the Institution of Cultural Leaders Bill - which was passed into law on 31st January - related to the limiting the movement of Uganda's monarchs. Many Baganda felt that the original wording would have overly restricted the activities of their own king, Kabaka Mutebi II. </div>
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In the North, too, Museveni also made significant gains among the local electorate. Certainly, this was helped by the largesse he had at his disposal following the notorious 'failed' Juba peace agreement with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in November 2008. Although Joseph Kony infamously failed to sign that peace agreement at the 11th hour, those international donors who had made commitments to the reconstruction effort that would follow its signing still made good on their commitments. Thus, over the last 2 years, tens of millions of dollars of new donor money have been flowing into the LRA-effected parts of Northern Uganda. And as Museveni has moved around those same areas during these campaigns, he left no one in any doubt as to who had to thank for this new money. Yet so too, his rhetoric also seemed more in tune with local concerns over land issues, especially in the potentially most contested areas of Bunyoro. It is for these reasons, then, that Museveni won in all but three Northern districts - an outcome that would have seemed almost impossible even 18 months ago. </div>
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Moreover, donor money was not the only largesse that Museveni distributed during these campaigns. In addition, Museveni also gave out 'new district' status to a number of regions (including Kapelebyong, in the east, and Nabilatuk, in the north). This follows his long-standing policy of using increased decentralization - and the new revenues it generates - as a means for satisfying local elites. Elsewhere, the connection between Museveni's campaign and the distribution of state funds was even more direct. My favourite example was from Mbarara Town, where National Resistance Movement (NRM) officials literally handed out cash to trading associations in the town, in return for their support. </div>
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In this context, then, the scale of Museveni's victory is not really as surprising as it at first appears. The key questions, then, are how and when Museveni might ever be removed from office? Certainly, this current result would suggest that the opposition momentum which had been built up over a decade or more has now dissipated. Yet if this is the case, then it might suggest that Museveni will simply never be beaten at the polls. Debate continues over whether Museveni might eventually hand over power to his son, Kainerugaba Muhoozi. However, this doesn't seem likely in the short term. In addition, it is possible that he might eventually face some sort of internal challenge from with the NRM (perhaps led by someone such as Minister of Security Amama Mbabazi). However, regime insiders have the prospect of impending oil production and associated revenues as an incentive to remain inside the tent, and it is thus unlikely that they are going to 'rock the boat' anytime soon. </div>
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Thus, it is NO CHANGE! as they having been saying in Uganda for many years and, it seems quite likely, will be continuing to say for some time to come.</div>
</div>Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-70680253427541380102011-02-06T09:48:00.000-08:002012-05-24T15:53:00.673-07:00Besigye raises the temperatureKizza Besigye should be doing better in the current campaigns. Having eroded Museveni's share of the vote across the last two presidential elections (Museveni received 75% in 1996, but only 69% in 2001 and 57% in 2006), everyone - including Besigye himself - anticipated another strong showing this time around. <br />
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Moreover, in late August, Besigye emerged from the nominations as the sole Inter-Party Cooperation (IPC) candidate, and therefore in his strongest position ever. At the time, the IPC was made up of Besigye's own Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) as well as the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), the Justice Forum (JEEMA) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Besigye secured the nomination after seeing off a strong challenge from UPC leader Olara Otunnu, thanks in part to a major strategic error that Otunnu made in the latter stages of the nomination process, by calling for the IPC to withdraw from the election, in protest at the perceived bias of the Electoral Commission (EC).</div>
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Otunnu's suggestion to withdraw may well have been influenced by recent events in Burundi, in which opposition parties similarly withdrew from the June 2010 presidential polls, in a move which significantly undermined incumbent President Pierre Nkurunziza's eventual victory. However, in Uganda, the very suggestion of just pulling out appeared to contradict the main opposition parties' proud democratic traditions (which are most keenly felt among Otunnu's own UPC). After all, most opposition groups had even stayed in through the notorious December 1980 elections, long after it became clear that those polls were badly flawed. Thus, although most members of the IPC, including Besigye himself, have long decried the EC's connections to the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM), Otunnu's plan was flatly rejected by the IPC, and by large sections of the UPC. Otunnu later withdrew from the IPC, to stand for the presidency on a UPC ticket. However, a number of UPC MPs, led by former party leader Jimmy Akena, announced that they did not support him, leaving his challenge dead in the water. </div>
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With Otunnu out of the picture, Besigye was well positioned to mount a strong challenge against Museveni. However, his campaign has faltered from the outset. Certainly, a significant factor has been his near-constant harassment by the authorities. Moreover, the IPC has been in effect blocked from many media outlets (in one example, the IPC Campaign Bureau claimed in mid-December that nine regional radio stations had refused to carry any opposition content whatsoever. In addition, Museveni himself is running a much better campaign this time around than many had expected. </div>
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Nevertheless, Besigye has also made a number of key strategic errors. Firstly, in mid-September, he chose to launch his manifesto in South Africa, in an effort to appeal to the international community, and to the Ugandan Diaspora. By doing so, he presumably hoped to bolster his backing in the event of another contested election result (Besigye eventually won a partial High Court victory over the 2006 election, when it was ruled that 'irregularities' had taken place in those polls). However, in light of the Otunnu affair - during which Besigye was in effect forced to confirm his faith in the EC (he went on to say on radio that there will be 'no rigging' in the current election, and that he will not contest this result through the courts) - the move to South Africa now appears to have been wasted. </div>
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Secondly, Besigye has made a huge mistake in these campaigns by concentrating his own campaigning upon the rural areas. The problem is that much of the IPC's appeal to date has been to a mainly urban base (especially of young, educated voters), and thus may not address rural concerns. This was highlighted, for example, during Besigye's recent campaigns in the north-west, during which he spoke a great deal about the distribution of future revenues from the region's recently discovered oil reserves. While this issue will affect the political landscape in years to come, few people in the rural areas would today regard it as nearly as pressing as, say, the region's land issues.</div>
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As a result, then, Besigye's support has slumped in recent opinion polls. His response has been to file a High Court injunction, compelling the EC to postpone the elections, on the basis that as many as 4 million new voters will not have been issued with voter cards by the time of the 18th February polls. The move was a new tactic, in that it again attacked the EC, although this time not for its bias, but for its incompetence. However, the injunction was rejected, the High Court ruling that the elections can go ahead without the voter cards. </div>
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It is in this context, then, that over the last couple of weeks, Besigye's rhetoric has become more confrontational, and he now claims that the IPC may withdraw from the elections after all, given that the elections <i>will</i> be rigged. This latest move is doubtless designed to renew his appeal to the international community, and to the Diaspora. However, in light of his previous rejection of these same arguments when Otunnu made them, and his own subsequent statements about his faith in the electoral process, the current rhetoric sounds quite peculiar indeed. In addition, in recent days Besigye has sought to raise the temperature still further, by raising the spectre of Egypt, by referring to the current government as a 'dictatorship', and by making oblique references to 'popular unrest'.</div>
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If tensions continue to rise here, then Uganda may well be in for a bumpy few weeks. We will find out soon enough.</div>
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<br /></div>Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-52281977034368049862011-01-24T07:05:00.000-08:002011-11-03T00:39:21.412-07:00DJ M7A recent opinion poll conducted by Afrobarometer left us in little doubt as to who is going to win the presidential election on 18th February: it placed Museveni on 66%, and Besigye on just 12% (with Otunnu and Mao on 3% each). <br />
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Certainly, the incumbent was always going to be the favourite here, given his privileged access to the 'levers of state'. Nevertheless, it has come as a surprise to many, even to veteran Uganda commentators, that he is so far ahead at this stage. </div>
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One of the reasons why Museveni is doing so well is the skill with which he (with his team) has controlled his media persona throughout these campaigns. Perhaps it is the case that all elections, the world over, now hinge on the way in which the protagonists present themselves in the media. However, it is worth remembering that in Uganda, this is a relatively recent phenomenon, given that most of the population, outside of the main urban areas, still have only limited access to print media, or to television - or in other words, to any form of <i>visual</i> media. Hence it is a masterstroke that Museveni's media persona in these campaigns has been centred around <i>sound</i>, or more specifically, a 'rap' song - one which has been played seemingly <i>ad infinitum </i>in recent weeks, on the dozens of radio stations which now broadcast throughout the countryside.</div>
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The origins of Museveni's song trace to a free concert that was held in Central Kampala a few days before the nominations closed, in late-October. Museveni arrived at the concert in full military fatigues, and proceeded to 'rap' to the gathering crowd (he was in fact reciting two well-known Runyankore nursery rhymes). His efforts were recorded, and were subsequently re-mixed as a campaign soundtrack by the fashionable Fenon Studios. The track was an immediate success, for two reasons.</div>
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Firstly, the song has galvanized Uganda's young urban voters to the president's cause. This constituency had previously been a mainstay for Besigye and his Forum for Democratic Change (FDC). Secondly, and more importantly, the way in which Fenon remixed Museveni's words recast his patter in the style of someone doing '<i>okwevuga</i>'. This is a highly technical form of public oratory, by no means easily mastered, which involves a stylized form of rapid rhyme that is rich in allegory and metaphor - hence it <i>is</i> in some ways similar to (at least the more artful forms of) commercial 'rap'. The practice of <i>okwevuga</i> is today most frequently associated with wedding ceremonies, where guests sometimes use it in their speeches. However, it has also been associated, from pre-colonial times onwards, with skilled political leadership. In recent years, a well-known radio presenter in South-western Uganda used it in the credits of his show, and to powerful effect - for a period, his show became the most popular program on the airwaves.</div>
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Thus, with the song now playing day-in, day-out, in villages across Uganda, the population is constantly reminded what a capable leader they have. Listen to Fenon's song:</div>
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In the weeks following the release of the track, a number of newspapers, including Uganda's main Luganda-language paper <i>Bukedde</i>, poked fun at the song, by publishing pictures of Museveni's face spliced onto the body of various famous 'gangsta rappers'. Museveni's press secretary Tamale Mirundi reacted angrily to the images, describing them as 'offensive', and demanding that they be immediately dropped from future publications.<br />
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Yet Mirundi's reaction is itself illustrative. Because it shows that his team does not want any unauthorized images of the president to undermine their carefully constructed control of the aural media space - the very space in which their campaign is currently being won (and the fact that Zain telecom have now turned the song into a mobile phone ringtone is another interesting aside here). </div>
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A member of Besigye's campaign team recently quipped that if he wants to mount a come-back in the current campaign, then he will also have to release a rap-song. Otherwise, it will surely be DJ Museveni who is still in State House on 19th February.</div>
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<br /></div>Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-13618804459629921332010-10-14T20:01:00.000-07:002011-11-03T00:37:48.890-07:00LRA on the march again<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">The first time I was told that the LRA were on the brink of defeat was in 1997. Since then, the rebel group has shown a remarkable ability for sustaining their insurgency, even in the face of (at times) massive military opposition to it.</span><br />
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">The current round of military pressure against the group was begun in December 2008, with the launch of the Ugandan Army's (UPDF) Operation 'Lightening Thunder'. Targeted against the LRA's main bases in North-eastern Congo (DRC), the operation - which had the support of the Congolese Army (FARDC), the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and even the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), aimed to achieve a final defeat of Joseph Kony's men with 3 weeks.</span><br />
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">The operation got off to a poor start, with the Ugandans failing to deliver enough men and supplies to the front line, and with the LRA receiving tip-offs about the attack (many of the Ugandan soldiers involved in the operation were themselves decommissioned LRA fighters, some of whom remained loyal to their former boss). Nevertheless, as the months went on, and especially following the UPDF's entry into the Central African Republic (CAR) in mid 2009 - to which many LRA leaders, including Kony himself, had fled in February of that year - the tide began to turn in the UPDF's favour.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">Into late 2009, the UPDF began to score some significant victories, including the capture of one of Kony's most senior officers, Major Okot Atiak, and the killing of at least seven other senior LRA leaders. In November, another senior commander, Lt. Colonel Charles Arop, surrendered to the UPDF. It later transpired that on 2nd October, the UPDF had come clo</span>se to securing the biggest prize of all when, in an attack in Djemah in Eastern CAR, they had fired upon, and almost captured, Joseph Kony himself.</div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">However, the optimism which followed these victories proved short lived. </span>By the end of 2009, it was increasingly obvious that these military successes were coming at a terrible price, as the LRA, in its weakened state, was carrying out ever greater predations on surrounding civilian populations, as the group looted supplies, and sought to bolster their ranks through the forced recruitment of child soldiers. In one attack in December 2009, LRA fighters killed an estimated 345 civilians over 4 days in Haut-Uele (DRC) in the largest single massacre in the group's 23 year history. By August 2010, it was estimated that in the preceding 18 months, Kony's men had killed up to 2000 civilians (which would again make it the bloodiest 18 months in the group's history). Over the same period, the LRA had also kidnapped 1,600 more people, and had caused a massive 300,000 to flee their homes.</div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">In addition, despite the UPDF's best efforts to disrupt Kony's command and control structures, by mid-2010 the LRA had reestablished organizational coherence, by moving to a 'zonal' mode of operation. In this way, each remaining LRA commander was allocated a particular zone in which he could operate without further authorization from Kony. Thus, Kony's brother, Major David Olanya, was allowed to operate freely in Maboussou-Gambala (CAR), General Binasio Okumu in Obo (CAR), and so on. Operating as independent units in this way, the LRA became much more difficult to disrupt than it had been previously, and it was able to operate over a much wider area. By mid-2010, the group's increasingly bloody attacks were being carried out as far apart as the extremes of Orientale Province (DRC), Western Equatoria (Southern Sudan) and in Eastern CAR as far north as the border with Chad.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">At the same time, the UPDF force deployed in the CAR in pursuit of the LRA had began to run into problems of its own. Primary among these was a wave of infighting among the leadership, which eventually resulted in the force commander, Colonel Emmanuel Rwashande, being replaced. In addition, the Ugandan government decided to withdraw 1000 of the 7000-strong force, and to redeploy these men to Karamoja in North-western Uganda. Further drawdowns are also likely as President Museveni seeks to bolster security back home ahead of the next February's presidential elections. </span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">Thus, by September of this year, the LRA had become significantly emboldened that they appear to have made contact with the Khartoum controlled Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The LRA was formerly equipped by the SAF throughout its long-running insurgency in Northern Uganda. If these reports are true, it would suggest that LRA leaders are confident that they may once again prove useful to the Khartoum regime - especially if, as expected, the forthcoming referendum in Sudan results in a further round of conflict between the SAF and the SPLA. </span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">Last week's report that Kony himself has now moved to Darfur might also point to this Khartoum connection. So too would recent reports that the LRA are also now forging an alliance with another CAR militia, the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) - another longtime proxy of Khartoum. Certainly, if the LRA and the UFDR were to join forces, then it would bode ill for UPDF troops in the CAR, especially given the wealth of fighting experience, and sophisticated weaponry, upon which the UFDR can draw. </span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">I was recently at a conference at which I heard, in a paper given by a European government official, that the LRA insurgency was now on the wane and that, following the passing of the recent anti-LRA bill by the US Congress (in May this year), that the group should now on the brink of a final defeat. I hope that he's right, of course. However, the first time I was told that the LRA were on the brink of defeat was in 1997.</span></div>
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</div>Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-59589256682782790772010-08-20T22:19:00.001-07:002011-11-03T00:38:30.464-07:00The recent offensive against the ADF-NALUOne of Uganda's most notorious rebel movements of recent years, the Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU) are back in the public eye following a recent offensive against them by the Congolese army (FARDC). The offensive, called 'Operation Rwenzori', was launched in late June, and targeted the remnants of the ADF-NALU, who have been holed up in several villages in the Beni region of North Kivu since the late 1990s.<br />
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The operation appears to have been quite successful, and within a month of its launch, the FARDC had overrun all of the ADF-NALU's positions, had killed or arrested several dozen of their number (including several of their military leaders), and had put the remainder of the estimated 1,300-strong force to flight. However, the offensive also resulted in ADF-NALU reprisal attacks against civilian targets, and the displacement of 90,000 Congolese citizens. </div>
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A question remains as to why the FARDC offensive was launched at this particular point in time? </div>
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Formed in 1996, the organization that became the ADF-NALU is best known for a series of bomb blasts they carried out in Kampala in the late 1990s, and for an insurgency the group mounted in Western Uganda - especially in the Banyuruguru and Kasese regions - around the same period. The insurgency was never as large as that of other rebel groups, such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Nevertheless, it soon became notorious, especially follow a series of particularly violent attacks against civilian targets. In one such attack, on Kichwamba Technical Institute, on June 8th 1998, ADF-NALU fighters burned 49 students to death in the dormitory, and abducted 80 others. </div>
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Like many people working in Western Uganda during this period, I remember the insurgency well, not least because it required me to relocated my planned field site, for my doctoral fieldwork in anthropology, away from Banyuruguru, to a site further east (I have ended up working in the Rwampara Hills ever since). In addition, I later discovered that the brother of one of my closest friends in Uganda was amongst the 49 students killed in Kichwamba. He actually survived the initial fire in the dormitory, and was flown by military helicopter to Kampala, but later died from his injuries. However, in late 1999, the Ugandan army (UPDF) destroyed most of the group's bases in Eastern Congo, and either captured, or killed, most ADF-NALU fighters. Since 2001, the group has been more or less dormant (although they did resurface briefly in March 2007).</div>
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Thus, the recent FARDC operation against the group came as something of a surprise. In recent months, the UPDF have been making public statements that the ADF-NALU were again recruiting, and some media sources have since linked them to the July 11 bomb blasts in Kampala. However, there is little evidence that the group has been mobilizing again, and it has now been established that the recent bombings were almost certainly carried out by Somali militants. </div>
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Thus, the question remains as to why did the FARDC launch Operation Rwenzori at this time?</div>
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The real answer probably lies in President Kabila's current attempt to present himself - ahead of next year's Congolese presidential elections - as the best person to deliver security to the troubled Eastern regions, and as the key defender of Congolese 'sovereigneity'. In pursuit of this agenda, in recent months Kabila's government has been putting increasing pressure on the UN to have all international peacekeepers withdrawn from the country before next year's elections (which start in November 2011). In late May, the Security Council allowed the mandate of the existing UN Mission to the Congo (MONUC) to expire, but voted to create a new one-year mission, the UN Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO), with only a minor drawdown in forces. In effect, the UN has given Kabila, and the FARDC, a new deadline by which to prove that they can manages the security situation in the east on their own. It is in this context, then, that the FARDC had been looking for an 'easy target', against which to prove their capabilities to international observers, and it appears that the remnants of a largely dormant Ugandan group simply best 'fit the bill' here.</div>
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However, routing the ADF-NALU is one thing. There remain much bigger, and much better organized, militias in Eastern Congo, and much bigger security challenges lie ahead. Thus, the FARDC still has much to do if it really is going to prove that it <i>can </i>achieve order in the East. </div>Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-46522306831887585122010-07-16T00:45:00.000-07:002011-11-03T00:35:59.124-07:00Kampala bomb blasts<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0cm; mso-layout-grid-align: none; mso-pagination: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span lang="EN-US"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">Most people are struggling to comprehend last Sunday's bomb blasts which left at least 74 people dead, and several hundred more injured. The blasts took place at around 9.30 pm local time in two locations - Ethiopian Village, in Kabalagala and Kyadondo Rugby Club, in Nakawa - as patrons at both venues were watching the final stages of the World Cup final. </span></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">Responsibility for the attacks was eventually claimed by Somalia's Islamist militia, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (usually known as just 'al-Shabaab') which both the international community, and the global media, have been quick to connect with the al-Qaeda network.</span></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">This is the first time that al-Shabaab - which is currently at war with Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) - has struck outside of Somalia itself, and the attacks therefore represent a significant widening of the Somali conflict, a 'regionalization' of that war. However, the question remains as to why al-Shabaab should have attacked targets in Uganda, rather than in, say, Ethiopia, or Kenya?</span></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">Certainly, part of the answer lies in the fact that Uganda is currently supplying over half of the troops (2700) for the African Union's Mission to Somali (AMISOM). Since early 2007, AMISOM has been effectively fighting al-Shabaab, and other Islamist militias, on the TFG's behalf, especially in and around Mogadishu. Perhaps not surprisingly, in the wake of the Kampala bombs, the Ugandan army (UPDF) has now offered an additional 2000 soldiers to the mission. </span></span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;">However, other East Africa countries, especially Ethiopia, have also been engaged militarily in Somalia, and indeed, over a much longer period than Uganda. So why, then, were none of these other countries attacked on Sunday as well?</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">One answer is that al-Shabaab may well have tried to launch strikes in those other places as well, but were thwarted by local security services (some of whom are better placed to deal with Somali threats than the Ugandan security services). Certainly, the fact that the initial arrests after Sunday's blasts were all made in Kenya - or on the basis of Kenyan intelligence - suggests that the Nairobi-based intelligence services have a much tighter grip on al-Shabaab than do other regional governments.</span></span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia; font-size: small;"> </span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">In addition, it may have been easier for al-Shabaab to launch an attack in Uganda given that a number of their operatives had recently been brought into the country by…the UPDF. <o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">From late last year onwards, the Ugandan army have been training Somali forces at the Bihanga Military Training School in Ibanda, South-western Uganda (as part of their AMISOM commitment). While this training programme is obviously designed for units loyal to the TFG, it is now clear that from the very beginning, it has been infiltrated by al-Shabaab. </span></span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;">For example, it has been revealed that several al-Shabaab members who were recently killed by the UPDF in Mogadishu had previously been trained at Ibanda. Yet if the Bihanga programme has been infiltrated in this way, then it would have been particularly easy for an al-Shabaab cell to carry out Sunday’s attacks, by simply ‘staying on’ in Uganda after the course had finished.</span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">In addition, it is also worth pointing out that Uganda may be a more highly symbolic target for al-Shabaab than either Ethiopia or Kenya. After all, the country is about to host a summit of AU leaders. More generally, not least because of its current status as the ‘development miracle’ in East Africa, Uganda perhaps better symbolizes the kind of (imagined) Western modernity against which groups like al-Shabaab perceive themselves to be resisting. <o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">In this regard, the fact that the two main bomb attacks took place in the Kabalagala neighbourhood of Kampala is probably not coincidental, given that this area has for long symbolized ‘free living’. The neighbourhood first emerged as social hub during the Amin years, at which time most ordinary Kampalans feared to venture out in more central parts of the city after dark, given the fear of arbitrary arrest at that time. However, in recent years it has become more synonymous, in popular discourse throughout Uganda (and indeed, throughout East Africa) as a symbol of the social excesses of the western ex-patriot community. <o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">As a result, over the last twenty years or so, Kabalagala has been repeatedly targeted for bomb attacks, by a range of reactionary groups (including by a number of other Islamist-oriented organizations). Thus, for example, in the late 1990s, a number of bars in Kabalagala were targeted in a series of grenade attacks carried out by the rebel Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). <o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">In short, then, Kampala may well have represented both a key political target, and a perfect symbolic target, for those who carried out last Sunday’s attacks. </span></span><o:p></o:p></span></div>Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-71634204544832617012010-07-12T00:59:00.000-07:002012-05-24T15:53:00.678-07:00Election 2011 - Besigye shows his political acumen<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">So we now have the probable date of next year's elections, following the publication of the Electoral Commission (EC) 'roadmap'. If all goes according to plan, the main presidential and parliamentary elections will take place in late February 2011. </span></span><br />
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">As the</span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;"> campaigns now gather pace - ahead of the new deadline for the registration of candidates (on October 26th) - Besigye is once again demonstrating his political skill. Having recently suffered a series of setbacks, including challenges from within his own Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), and competition from other opposition candidates - most notably Olara Otunnu of the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) and Norbert Mao of the Democratic Party (DP) - Besigye is once again on the offensive:</span></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">- </span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">In recent weeks, Besigye loyalists have undertaken a sustained campaign of undermining both Otunnu and Mao, by representing them as stooges of the NRM. The tactic, previously used on one of Besigye's internal challengers, FDC MP Beti Kamya, is to list historic connections between those individuals and Museveni, in an attempt to portray them as moles who have been planted specifically to fragment the opposition vote.</span></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">- </span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">Besigye has also sought to undermine both Otunnu and Mao by providing both public and private support to splinter-groups within both the UPC and DP. In late June, the FDC leadership gave their approval to a break away UPC faction led by Sam Luwero, which has subsequently formed its own party, the Uganda National Congress (UNC), and which is now expected to also joint the FDC-led Inter-Party Cooperation (IPC). </span></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">- </span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">This follows an earlier move in which the FDC had stood-down their own candidate for the Mukono North byelection, in order to let DP candidate Betty Nambooze win (FDC leaders, including Besigye himself, also travelled to Mukono to campaign on Nambooze’s behalf). Nambooze represents a faction of the DP which is openly hostile to Mao’s leadership. </span></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">- T</span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">he move also played well with the FDC’s Baganda constitency, given that Nambooze is also a prominent member of the baganda elite. Indeed, as a result of the event, several key members of the Kingdom of Buganda establishment appeared to come out in support of Besigye – something which did much to repair the ethnic divisiveness of his earlier rift with Beti Kamya (who had based her challenge of on the claim that Besigye - an ethnic mukiga - was sidelining baganda interests within the party). </span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;"> </span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;"> </span></span><br />
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">As a result of these moves, Besigye has once again emerged, in recent weeks, as the key figure in the Ugandan opposition. And it is for this reason that the government are currently focusing so much of their attention on him personally. </span></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">Thus, over the past three months alone</span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">, the police have twice stood by as Besigye was beaten up, first, at a rally in Mpigi District (as he was attacked by a lone agitator), and then at an event in Kampala, (when he was set-upon by a vigilante group, the ‘Kiboko Squad’). </span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;">In addition, the police have twice arrested Besigye, first for comments he allegedly made urging FDC members to ‘break the thumbs’ of NRM supporters, and then for comments he allegedly made that the government had secretly sold-off Lake Kioga to an (unnamed) South-African firm. He has also narrowly avoided arrest on a number of other occasions. </span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;">Moreover, regional administrators have effectively barred local radio stations – or any other media outlets – from carrying interviews with Besigye, or any other members of the FDC (as noted in the recent HRW report, discussed in a previous blog).</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">The opposition's chances against Museveni at next year's elections will be greatly improved if they can unite around a single candidate. Recently events have once again demonstrated that Besigye still has the best chance of emerging as that candidate. And it is for this reason that the government are currently so focused on trying to thwart </span></span><i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">his</span></span></i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;"> campaign.</span></span></div>Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-31501356377952935552010-06-18T23:20:00.001-07:002011-11-03T00:34:25.584-07:00A nation of drunkards?Earlier this week, the head of the Kampala-based Serenity Centre for Alcoholics Rehabilitation, David Kalema, claimed that 3 million Ugandans (approximately 10% of the population) drink excessively, with a further 1.5 million being 'vulnerable to alcohol'. The comments are apparently based on figures published by the WHO. <br />
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However, Kalema then went on to blame all of Uganda's social ills, from poverty, to unemployment, to family breakdown, to HIV/AIDS, to car accidents on alcohol. </div>
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The argument that alcohol consumption in Uganda is both excessive, and a generally bad thing, is one that is shared by most of the development community. Indeed, I have yet to meet any development professional who does not share these views (even though they might not always express them as forcefully as Mr. Kalema), and I have yet to read any development report that does not decry the 'evils of alcohol'.</div>
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However, it is interesting to note that the academic literature on alcohol in Africa frequently takes an almost diametrically opposite line on the social effects of alcohol. Thus, rather than seeing alcohol consumption as the root of social degeneration, a range of academic studies from Uganda and elsewhere have instead emphasized the importance of drinking events - in both rural and urban settings - as a key means of social cohesion (especially amongst men), as the basis of many types of ongoing exchange relations, and as spaces for political mobilization. </div>
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So which is it, then? Alcohol as 'social evil', or alcohol as 'social glue'?</div>
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At least part of the answer here may be found if we take a longer time perspective. Drawing on the historical evidence from South-western Uganda, it is clear that by the mid-nineteenth century, at least, most social events, from ritual exchanges, to weddings, to funerals etc. involved some form of alcohol consumption. Originally, this involved millet beer (<i>amarwa</i>), although following the establishment of bananas as the staple - from around the late-nineteenth century onwards - this was generally replaced by banana wine (<i>tonto</i>). </div>
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Even today, most social events in this region involve an exchange of <i>tonto</i>, whilst daily social life frequently also revolves around sharing a glass or two with some or other relative, neighbour or friend (this is especially true for men, and for either younger, or older, women). In addition, the social networks which emerge from these daily drinking practices fulfill an important role, their members often helping each other to gather a harvest, raise school fees, or to deal with some sort of crisis (for example, I was once living in a village during a period of prolonging famine, during which drinking groups of this sort met daily to discuss survival strategies for their members' households). </div>
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Thus, drinking practices, and the social forms these create, <i>are</i> central to sociality in this region. However, it is also true that some later developments have had some less propitious effects. Specifically, during the Second World War, thousands of Ugandan men served abroad in the King's African Rifles (KAR), and upon their return, brought back knowledge of 'the bar', and of the practices of stilling. Thus, from the 1950s onwards, bars were established in villages throughout Uganda, which now sold not <i>tonto</i>, but its stilled variant, <i>waragi</i>. In other words, alcohol became both commercialized, and much (much!) stronger. </div>
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Also in the 1950s, commercially bottled beer became widely available, with the establishment of Nile Breweries (in Jinja, in 1956), and the expansion of the Kenyan giant, East African Breweries, into the Ugandan market at around the same time. </div>
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The commercialization of alcohol changed the way in which <i>tonto </i>was produced. Previously, someone who was brewing a batch of the drink would make only enough to give to his 'exchange partners'. Now, on the other hand, a brewer was guaranteed that any excess could be sold to a local bar, and as a result, people began to produce much more than they needed. Young men, in particular, began to give over more and more of their plantations to the <i>tonto</i>-making variety of bananas (<i>embiire</i>); in effect, <i>embiire</i> became a cash-crop. And one result of<i> this</i> was that more and more <i>tonto</i> began to circulate in the villages than ever before. It was in this context, then, that bar owners increasingly used up the 'excess' <i>tonto</i> by making <i>waragi</i> (it takes about 25 litres of <i>tonto</i> to make 1 litre of <i>waragi</i>. In addition, there is also the advantage that even 'stale' <i>tonto</i> - that which has become too sour to drink - can be used for stilling). And the result of <i>this </i>was more and more <i>waragi. </i> </div>
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Moreover, throughout the colonial period, Ugandans were effectively banned from buying alcohol, the sale of which was reserved for Europeans (the historian Justin Willis has written very well about this in his book 'Potent Brews', 2002). However, as elsewhere, the result of such prohibition was to stimulate the desire for commercial drinks. Thus, as soon as <i>tonto</i>, <i>waragi</i> and branded drinks became available for purchase, their purchase became marked as an act of status and prestige (an act that more and more people were able to achieve, as cash incomes became ever higher, at all levels of society, from the 1960s onwards). Today, all of this holds just astrue for a local village man who celebrates the sale of his cow by <i>buying</i> everyone in the bar <i>waragi</i>, as it is for the state minister who displays his status by serving everyone at his party with Johnny Walker whiskey. </div>
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So Mr. Kalema's comments are overly-pessimistic, certainly. Much academic, especially ethnographic, research has shown how crucial alcohol is to (male) sociality in this part of the world, and beyond. Nevertheless, the history of production and consumption in this region also reveals that the amount, and the strength, of alcohol in circulation has become ever higher over the last half century or so. </div>Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7870469897078537392.post-21382987639540335782010-06-03T01:10:00.000-07:002012-11-11T00:46:43.439-08:00Review- A Media Minefield (HRW Report)<a href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_gSbnY5X23C8/TAdjvfuhL7I/AAAAAAAAABE/TjlqJKEROy8/s1600/uganda0510.jpg"><img alt="" border="0" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5478457139341111218" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_gSbnY5X23C8/TAdjvfuhL7I/AAAAAAAAABE/TjlqJKEROy8/s320/uganda0510.jpg" style="cursor: hand; cursor: pointer; float: right; height: 254px; margin: 0 0 10px 10px; width: 200px;" /></a> <br />
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">I have just finished reading HRW's new report on Uganda's media, 'A Media Minefield'. The full report can be downloaded </span></span><span lang="EN-US"><a href="http://www.hrw.org/node/90067"><span style="color: #54128b; font-family: Georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">here</span></span></a></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">. </span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">The report's main argument is that 'freedom of expression across the country is in significant jeopardy' (p. 2), as the government seeks to rescind some of the media freedoms it introduced following its accession to power in 1986. The argument is that the government is making these moves in the run-up to this year's general election, in an attempt to stifle opposition campaigning on both urban and rural media outlets. </span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">The basic tenets of this argument are sound, and there is little doubt that media freedoms have been gradually eroded in Uganda over the last few years. In addition, the government has increasingly sought to displace criticism of its own actions onto the media. In the most recent example, President Museveni had Monitor group Managing Editor Daniel Kalinaki and Sunday Monitor Editor Henry Ochieng arrested for 'forgery'. The charges related to a letter that Museveni himself had written to the Bunyoro Kingdom - promising to 'ring-fence' certain elected offices for ethnic Banyoro - which the Sunday Monitor had later published. Interestingly, the president never disputed that he had written the letter, but instead argued that certain of its details had been altered in the publication. That case continues. In addition, there is little doubt that the opposition has most to fear from these moves, certainly if the rhetoric of current Minister of Information and National Guidance, Kabakumba Matsiko, is to be believed. Matsiko is an example of one of the new generation of NRM firebrands' (about which I have written in previous blogs), who wastes no opportunity to attack the opposition. Matsiko is also one of the driving forces behind the new Press and Journalist (Amendment) Bill (2010), which if passed, will make it more difficult for independent outlets to report opposition views on certain key issues.</span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">Nevertheless, as someone who has been researching Uganda's media environments for over a decade, I still found the narrative of this HRW report too simplistic, and its interpretation of the evidence too narrow. In particular, the idea that the 'expanded number of government regulatory bodies, which have mandates to oversee, control, and monitor the media' (p. 11) have been introduced only for purposes of limiting media freedom - i.e. for the government's own instrumental political purposes - fails to understand just how complex Uganda's media environment has become over the last 10 years. </span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">Since the NRM first introduced their media liberalization reforms, in 1993, Ugandans have gained access to a quite startling array of international, national, and regional media content. For example, in the past 15 years, more than 100 new newspapers have appeared in the country, more than 50 new radio stations, and at least a dozen new TV operations (some of which, such as DsTV or GTV, have themselves each carried a dozen or more channels). Many of these new outlets have not lasted, not because the government has restricted them, but usually because they were simply not commercially viable. However, a number of those outlets that have survived have gone on to have quite powerful social effects. </span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Georgia;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">I havedocumented many of these effects in my published academic work. However, to note just one example here, in the late 1990s, the leadership of a charismatic Christian sect, the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God, used broadcasts on a Western regional radio station, Radio Voice of Toro FM, to convince people that the world was about to end. Many of the MRTC's members then went on to die in an inferno at Kanungu. </span></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: Georgia;"><o:p><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">In this context, then, the creation of ever more (and, I would add, ever more complex) regulatory bodies should be seen less, as an attempt by the government to undermine the media, so much an attempt by them to keep up with the increasingly complex realities that their own reforms had created. </span></o:p></span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">A similar point could also be made in relation to this report's main case study: the events surrounding last September's Baganda ethno-nationalist riots in Kampala. Certainly, the behaviour of some police officers, in the context of the riots themselves, was totally unacceptable, with numerous allegations being made of journalists (especially photo-journalists) being attacked by the police in their attempts to cover the story. However, the HRW report also goes on to criticize the government's decision - taken at the height of the rioting - to close down the Baganda Kingdom's own radio station, the Central Broadcasting Service (CBS). This criticism seems misplaced to me. Throughout the first day of the rioting, CBS presenters dedicated large parts of their shows to ringing around various parts of Kampala and its surrounds, to ask members of the public (on their mobile phones), whether any rioting had yet taken place in those areas. These calls had the effect of alerting all listeners to the places in which rioting had not yet begun, following which mobs travelled to those locations to 'stir things up'. The station's </span><i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">modus operandi</span></i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;"> was similar to that used by certain Kenyan radio station during the post-election violence of 2008. For that matter, it even smacked of the behaviour of Radio Television Libre des Mille Colines (RTLM) during the Rwandan genocide of 1994. </span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">In this context, then, it was in fact quite right and proper that the government should have pulled down the station's mast when they did, as parts of central Uganda teetered on the brink of even more serious ethnic violence. Certainly, the government have since made political gain by using this incident as a means to keep CBS off air (the station is currently suing the government over this decision, with the case due to be heard on 8th July). However, this alone does not invalidate the government's initial decision to turn-off the CBS signal when they did. Indeed, the rioting ended within just a few hours of the CBS shut-down (although there were other factors at play here as well). </span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">Thirdly, the HRW goes to great length to argue that the government is today going to great lengths to curtail </span><i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">all</span></i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;"> media, throughout Uganda. However, looking at the list of cases included in the report's Annex, I am struck by the fact that most of the charges have actually been brought against quite a small network of journalists. Thus, this list of defendants does not represent a broad swathe of opposition media in Uganda, but a small clique within the upper echelons of the Monitor group (some of whom have since gone on to create their own outlets, such as the Independent, and Life FM). Whilst this doesn't justify the charges, of course - indeed, I have no doubt that many of them are false - it might suggest that the government are taking aim here at not, the opposition media as a whole, so much as a specific set of people within those outlets, with some of whom they have historic grievances (and the fact that Andrew Mwenda tops the list here, is no surprise). Thus, there are also a number of other opposition newspapers and radio stations in Uganda which are not represented on this charge sheet.</span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">As I say, the basic tenets of this HRW report are sound. However, a more convincing attempt to sustain it would perhaps focus more on the problems that the New Vision group (which is government owned) have had in recent years. Whilst these did not lead to (significant) criminal charges, they did result in first William Pike, and then Els de Temmerman, resigning (in 2006, and 2008, respectively). </span></div>
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<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">Moreover, a more nuanced report might also make more of the </span><i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">limits</span></i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;"> of the state in its attempt to control the media. Simply put, Uganda's new media environments have becomes so complex, and so 'globalized' (not least since the advent of the internet), that it is today doubtful that </span><i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">any </span></i><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: small;">state body, or bodies, could - at least in any simple sense - 'control' it. </span></div>
Dr Richard Vokeshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15218905310412423648noreply@blogger.com0