The 'Walk to Work' campaign

People across Kampala, and other urban centres, are today bracing themselves for the sixth day of the 'Walk to Work' campaign (W2W). This campaign has already resulted in the worst civil disturbances in Uganda since the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power, in 1986. However, contrary to what some commentators are now suggesting, these protests are unlikely to develop into an 'Egyptian style' uprising.

Rather, W2W needs to be seen as a consequence of the recently concluded presidential and parliamentary elections. Following their disastrous showing in those polls, in early April, the Uganda opposition launched an organization for direct action, called the 'Activists for Change' (A4C). President Museveni's main opponent Kizza Besigye (who polled just 26% in February) and his Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) played a key role in its formation. MP-elect Mathias Mpuuga, a senior member of the Democratic Party (DP) and well-known Buganda-nationalist, fronts the organization, while two other presidential contenders - DP leader Norbert Mao and Uganda People's Congress (UPC) leader Olara Otunnu - are also highly visible. It is also supported by other opposition groups, and by a number of civil society organizations (including senior figures within the Church of Uganda).

On 11th April, A4C launched the W2W campaign, which was designed to harness popular discontent over rising food and fuel prices. Inflation had weakened to single digit figures following the global downturn, after averaging 12.5% during 2008-9, but has climbed steadily in the past six months - driven by rising food and fuel prices, and a weakening Ugandan shilling. In addition, government spending rose ahead of the polls - in line with January's supplementary budget of UgSh 600 billion - exacerbating these pressures. Food production also dropped throughout early-2011, as a result of a prolonged drought caused by the La Nina weather system (incidentally, I have documented the profound social consequences of a previous La Nina in my book Ghosts of Kanungu, 2009). The combined result was that headline inflation hit double-digit figures in March and April, while the food price index increased by 39.3% in April.

However, from the beginning, the main story of W2W was the security forces' markedly draconian response to the protests. On the first day of the campaign, Besigye, Mao and several dozen opposition MPs were arrested. Mao's arrest resulted in violent protests, in which the police shot dead three people. Besigye was arrested again two days later, and shot in the arm with a rubber bullet. Besigye and Mao were also arrested during the third W2W event. On 21st April, the fourth day of W2W, the police responded to a protest in Mpuuga's home town of Masaka by firing live rounds, accidentally killing a baby. On 28th April, during the fifth W2W action, Besigye attempted to drive into Kampala city centre. However, the police stopped his convoy on several occasions, before finally halting it near Wandageya. During the ensuing standoff, plainclothes police stormed Besigye's vehicle, and subdued him with pepper spray. Tear gas canisters were also fired directly at some of his entourage. Besigye was dragged from the vehicle, and manhandled into a waiting police truck. Cameramen from Kampala's NTV recorded the entire incident, and their footage can be viewed here:

When these images were broadcast on NTV (and other stations), and were posted on the internet, they triggered riots in various locations around Kampala. The earliest incidents were reported from various central locations, including the densely populated areas around Kisekka Market, the Old Taxi Park and Lugogo Stadium. However, they soon spread to various outlying locations as well, including the areas around the FDC headquarters in Najjanankumbi, and various sites along the Entebbe road (the largest being at Kajjansi, which is about 20 km south of Kampala). Later, they also spread to Makerere University, as well as to various other urban centres around the country (including Masaka, Mbale and Mbarara). At each of these locations, scores of mostly young men set tires and cars alight, and fought running battles with police and the army. The security forces fired tear gas and live ammunition into the crowds. At least 5 people were killed (all of them in and around Kampala), at least 139 were hospitalized (at least 20 of them with gunshot wounds), and more than 700 were arrested. Some sources have put the death toll as high as 9.

Both the opposition and media commentators have been quick to paint the events as a spontaneous outbreak of popular unrest directed against Museveni's government, similar to that which occurred in Egypt, and thus likely to gather momentum. However, the opposition's position here is overstated:

Firstly, there is no anti-regime consensus. Many Ugandans share the opposition's unease over food and fuel prices. However, there is no indication that most people directly blame the government for these. A recent televised address, in which Museveni cited external pressures for the economic strain, was sympathetically received among large sections of the population. And we must remember that Museveni was reelected with an overwhelming majority less than three months ago. Secondly, although there has been growing outrage at Besigye's treatment in recent weeks, it is unlikely that Friday's riots can be seen as an expression of popular support for him, or for his movement. All of the riots in Kamapala, in particular, occurred in and around long-established FDC strongholds - suggesting that they were orchestrated by existing FDC sympathizers (possibly even by the network of 'vigilante' groups with which the party has been associated in the past). Moreover, the fact that they all ended so quickly - even in Kisekka and Kajjansi, the scenes of the heaviest clashes, the rioting lasted no more than two hours - contrasts with the image of a 'popular uprising'. Finally, there is little indication that more people will become mobilized to the A4C cause as a result of Friday's riots. Certainly, FDC activists - especially the young men - are now expecting more violence, starting today. However, throughout 30th April and 1st May radio talk shows were also inundated with callers appealing for calm. For his part, Besigye himself - who following his arrest was flown to Nairobi for medical treatment - has subsequently made a similar request (albeit while also reiterating that peaceful protests would continue).

However, this is not to say that the government has emerged from all of this unscathed. On the contrary, Museveni and the security services have come in for growing criticism for their handling of events. The footage of Besigye's fourth arrest (above) - as well as a rather confused press conference in which Inspector General of Police Kale Kayihura criticized his own commanders for their actions before and during the riots - has fed negative perceptions. During Friday's events, the police entirely lost control of at least one of the riot sites (Kisekka), following which the Special Forces group - under the command of Museveni's son Kainerugaba Muhoozi - had to be called in (significantly escalating the violence at that location). Yesterday, Wednesday 4th May, hundreds of lawyers across the country began a three day strike to protest what they called the 'crimes against humanity' committed by the security services last Friday.

However, the biggest criticisms of the government's handling of events appears to be coming from the international community. In a snub to Museveni, Besigye was visited in prison by the Irish and Dutch ambassadors (on 11th April) and by the Norweigan and French ambassadors (on 18th April). And following the riots of 29th April, both the EU and the UN have publically criticized Museveni. The UN Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, called on the Ugandan government to halt its 'excessive' use of force on civilians.

So where do we go from here? Certainly, more civil unrest is likely in the days to come. However, this is unlikely to turn into an Egyptian style uprising. More likely, a combination of domestic and international pressure will force Museveni into major concessions, possibly involving a large tax reduction on fuel (a move just made in neighbouring Kenya). Rumours now abound in Kampala that the international community may even now try to force Museveni into forming a 'unity government' with the opposition, as a means for diffusion tensions. However, this is unlikely to happen, given the leverage that Museveni has as the lead player in ongoing peace keeping operations in Somalia. In addition, even if the opposition were brought into such an arrangement, it is unlikely that they would be able to turn this into tangible gains. To achieve these, they would also need to have to develop a coherent agenda - something they have singularly failed to do for the past 5 years (indeed, the W2W campaign is probably the first thing that they have agreed on, in all that time).

Still, in light the growing chorus of criticism of Museveni's handling of the protests, Besigye and his allies may already count the W2W campaign as a significant success.

Publication- Photography in early colonial Uganda, circa 1904-1928

We have recently published a special issue of the journal History and Anthropology, entitled Routes and Traces: Anthropology, Photography and the Archive. The collection is co-edited by myself and Marcus Banks, of the University of Oxford, and explores recent debates concerning the interpretation of historical ethnographic photographs.

The collection includes chapters on Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, West Africa and elsewhere. However, my own contribution explores the early history of the camera in Uganda, especially in the period around the staging of the famous Kampala Agricultural and Industrial Exhibition (which was held on the newly created show-grounds, below Mengo Hill, on 9th November 1908). Like other colonial expos of the time, the Kampala Exhibition was a key event in the early development of the colonial state in Uganda.

Many of the 'official' photographs that were taken in and around the Kampala Exhibition were produced by one photo studio, the Alfred Lobo Studio, which was opened in Entebbe in 1904, and which later moved to Kampala - where it remained until its closure circa 1939. Very little is known about Alfred Lobo himself, or about any of his studio's staff. The few biographical details we do have are neatly summarized in the Royal Commonwealth Society Photographers' Index, at the University of Cambridge Library. Nevertheless, my article argues that much can still be deduced from Lobo images about the contexts of photographic production, and circulation, in Uganda at this time.

Specifically, the article argues that many 'official' photographs of this period were taken in an attempt to represent the new Uganda colony as an inclusive, even collaborative, social project - one in which all of Uganda's ethnic groups, and all classes of its European colonists, had some part to play. However, these intentions were subsequently lost, as the photographs themselves were later circulated, and reproduced, in new ways. In particular, the article traces how several images from the Exhibition were later reprinted in a series of picture postcards, in ways which instead cast their African subjects in largely negative, and in some cases overtly racist, terms.

The contents of the special issue can be viewed here, on the Taylor and Francis website. This contents page currently allows the introduction to be downloaded, and it also includes an audio-interview I recorded with journal editor Stephen Lyon, in New Orleans in November 2010. The interview discusses the evolution of this special issue, recent scholarship on African photography, and some current general issues in visual anthropology.

NO CHANGE!...

...as they say in Uganda.

And so it has proved once again, with incumbent President Yoweri Museveni winning another 5 years in office, which will take his cumulative time in power to 30 years, by 2016. Whilst the fact that Museveni won the presidential election on 18th February came as a surprise to no one, the scale of his victory took even some veteran Uganda commentators by surprise. The final tally gave Museveni 68%, which is a return to his 2001 level of support, and a significant improvement on the 57% he received in 2006. His main challenger, Kizza Besigye, reversed gains made across the previous two elections by polling just 26%, whilst none of the other presidential candidates secured more than 2% each.

As I've argued before, the main story of these elections was one of opposition failure. Certainly, it did not help Besigye that throughout the campaigns, he was frequently harassed by the authorities, and effectively barred from many media outlets. Nevertheless, he also made key strategic errors, in particular in his choice of locations for campaigning, and in the tone of his rhetoric in some areas (for example, in the Southwest, his discourse centred around issues of ethnicity, even though this subject is of no great concern to most voters there).

However, again this, Museveni also ran a flawless campaign throughout, using both his own (extensive) personal charisma, and his control of the levers of state, to great effect. The first element was evident from the beginning, when he kicked off his bid for re-election by releasing a 'rap song' recorded by the fashionable Fenon Studios in Kampala. The song was played on radio stations throughout the country, and played particularly well with young urban voters - a constituency that had previously been a mainstay for the opposition - thus galvanizing Museveni's campaign from the off.

From there, though, Museveni also went on to 'repair' his relations with Baganda voters (who according to some commentators, are historically the most important voting bloc in the country). He achieved this by granting two key concessions. The first was to reopen the Buganda Kingdom's FM radio station, which had been closed since the Baganda-nationalist riots of September 2009. The second was to heavily amend several contested clauses within the Institution of Cultural Leaders Bill - which was passed into law on 31st January - related to the limiting the movement of Uganda's monarchs. Many Baganda felt that the original wording would have overly restricted the activities of their own king, Kabaka Mutebi II.

In the North, too, Museveni also made significant gains among the local electorate. Certainly, this was helped by the largesse he had at his disposal following the notorious 'failed' Juba peace agreement with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in November 2008. Although Joseph Kony infamously failed to sign that peace agreement at the 11th hour, those international donors who had made commitments to the reconstruction effort that would follow its signing still made good on their commitments. Thus, over the last 2 years, tens of millions of dollars of new donor money have been flowing into the LRA-effected parts of Northern Uganda. And as Museveni has moved around those same areas during these campaigns, he left no one in any doubt as to who had to thank for this new money. Yet so too, his rhetoric also seemed more in tune with local concerns over land issues, especially in the potentially most contested areas of Bunyoro. It is for these reasons, then, that Museveni won in all but three Northern districts - an outcome that would have seemed almost impossible even 18 months ago.

Moreover, donor money was not the only largesse that Museveni distributed during these campaigns. In addition, Museveni also gave out 'new district' status to a number of regions (including Kapelebyong, in the east, and Nabilatuk, in the north). This follows his long-standing policy of using increased decentralization - and the new revenues it generates - as a means for satisfying local elites. Elsewhere, the connection between Museveni's campaign and the distribution of state funds was even more direct. My favourite example was from Mbarara Town, where National Resistance Movement (NRM) officials literally handed out cash to trading associations in the town, in return for their support.

In this context, then, the scale of Museveni's victory is not really as surprising as it at first appears. The key questions, then, are how and when Museveni might ever be removed from office? Certainly, this current result would suggest that the opposition momentum which had been built up over a decade or more has now dissipated. Yet if this is the case, then it might suggest that Museveni will simply never be beaten at the polls. Debate continues over whether Museveni might eventually hand over power to his son, Kainerugaba Muhoozi. However, this doesn't seem likely in the short term. In addition, it is possible that he might eventually face some sort of internal challenge from with the NRM (perhaps led by someone such as Minister of Security Amama Mbabazi). However, regime insiders have the prospect of impending oil production and associated revenues as an incentive to remain inside the tent, and it is thus unlikely that they are going to 'rock the boat' anytime soon.

Thus, it is NO CHANGE! as they having been saying in Uganda for many years and, it seems quite likely, will be continuing to say for some time to come.